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Foreign investors often criticize Japanese corporations for not paying
enough attention to the interests of their shareholders. It might surprise
these critics, then, to learn that shareholders’ legal rights under the Japanese Companies Act are actually quite strong. Indeed, many of the rights
that shareholders’ rights advocates often support, including shareholders’
power to alter a corporate charter without board consent, shareholders’
power to control dividend payments, majority voting for board elections,
shareholders’ power to replace the board of directors, and shareholder access to a corporate ballot—all of which are strongly debated elsewhere—
are already effective in Japan. Moreover, derivative suits are easily initiated
and maintained. Shareholders of Japanese corporations are, therefore, in
an arguably stronger position than those in, for example, the United States.
Still, notwithstanding these Japanese statutory rights, foreign investors’ criticisms persist.
Two questions arise from this debate. First, why are shareholders of
Japanese corporations unable to leverage their strong rights to force corporate management to prioritize shareholders’ interests? Alternatively, why
are shareholder activists inactive in Japan? Second, if the existing shareholders’ rights are not actually used for activism, are they completely
meaningless? Or, do they have alternative effects, whether positive or
negative?
* Associate Professor, Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, University of Tokyo.
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This article answers these questions by summarizing and categorizing
the rights of shareholders of Japanese corporations into two characteristics.
First, shareholders of Japanese corporations have strong class-based rights
with respect to decision-making on a wide range of matters related to the
corporation and ample opportunity to take an initiative. These rights
might, in fact, be too strong, inducing managers to insulate themselves by
engaging in so-called “cross-shareholding” (kabushiki mochiai) relationship, which in turn likely weakens the rights of other shareholders in practice. The lack of support provided to activist shareholders by other
shareholders, especially those in these cross-shareholding relationships, is
the primary cause of activist ineffectiveness in Japan. When cross-shareholdings are unwound, however, these shareholder rights function as a latent threat on managers, disciplining them. The keys to ensuring that classbased shareholder rights are meaningful are, thus, distribution of share
ownership and restraint on management’s attempt to manipulate this distribution. Unfortunately, it is not easy to unwind already-established crossshareholdings through regulatory intervention.
Second, shareholders also possess strong individual rights to raise issues with the corporation, either by asserting a shareholder proposal or
filing a derivative suit, neither of which would the corporation disrupt for
the interest of other shareholders. These rights, again, might be too strong,
incentivizing individuals to take advantage of them in pursuit of personal
goals, rather than for the good of the corporation. Yet, whether the use of
these individual rights amounts to an abuse hinges on an evaluation of the
benefits achieved, namely, the supply of diverse views through shareholder
proposals and the deterrence effect of derivative suits. Possible future reforms to Japanese law ought to consider how to strike the right balance of
power for shareholders of Japanese corporations.

I. INTRODUCTION
Foreign investors often criticize Japanese corporations for not paying
enough attention to the interests of their shareholders.1 It might surprise
1. For example, Asian Corporate Governance Association, an organization consisting
primarily of institutional investors investing in Asian markets, has stated that “[i]mproved
corporate governance is not a panacea for the problems of Japan’s stock markets or economy, but it will be an essential element in the rebuilding of confidence. . . . It is in Japan’s
national interest, therefore, to converge towards global best practice in corporate governance
. . . .” Indeed, “[f]airer treatment of shareholders is an integral part of this process. It is
important to restore shareholders to their rightful, legal place as the owners of companies
and to ensure that their interests are protected alongside other stakeholders.” ASIAN CORP.
GOVERNANCE ASS’N, WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN 8 (2008), available at http://www.acga-asia.org/public/files/Japan%20WP_%20May2008.pdf.
Foreign investors are not the only ones to express this view. At a meeting of the Companies Act Subcommittee (Kaisha Hosei Bukai) of the Legislative Council (Hosei Shingikai),
which was established in April 2010 for the revision of the Companies Act, representatives of
two Japanese investors attributed the long-time underperformance of Japanese stock market
to the insufficient protection of the interest of shareholders and called for stronger corporate
governance. See HOSEI SHINGIKAI KAISHA HOSEI BUKAI, DAI 2 KAI KAIGI GIJIROKU [THE
MINUTES OF THE 2ND MEETING] 2-6, 10-15 (2010), available at http://www.moj.go.jp/content/
000049083.pdf (discussing the opinions of Mr. Daisuke Hamaguchi, executive director of
fund management for Pension Fund Association, and Mr. Yoichiro Iwama, former president

Spring 2014]

Legally “Strong” Shareholders of Japan

127

these critics, then, to learn that shareholders’ legal rights under the Japanese Companies Act2 (JCA) are actually quite strong.3 Indeed, many of
the rights that shareholders’ rights advocates often support, including
shareholders’ power to alter a corporate charter without board consent,4
shareholders’ power to control dividend payments,5 majority voting for
board elections,6 shareholders’ power to replace the board of directors,7
and shareholder access to a corporate ballot8—all of which are strongly
debated elsewhere—are already effective in Japan.9 Moreover, derivative
suits are easily initiated and hard to dismiss. Shareholders of Japanese corporations, therefore, are arguably in a stronger position than those in, for
example, the United States.10 Still, notwithstanding these Japanese statutory rights, foreign investors’ criticisms persist.
Two questions arise from this debate. First, why are shareholders of
Japanese corporations unable to leverage their strong rights to force corporate management to prioritize shareholders’ interests? Alternatively,
why are shareholder activists inactive in Japan? Second, if the existing
shareholders’ rights under Japanese law are not actually used for activism,
are they completely meaningless? Or, do they have alternative effects,
whether positive or negative? These are important questions, not only for
of Tokio Marine Asset Management Company, Limited and the chairman of Japan Investment Advisors Association). For the result of the discussions in this Subcommittee, see Gen
Goto, The Outline for the Companies Act Reform in Japan and Its Implications, 35 J. JAPANESE L. 13 (2013). The Reform Act of the Companies Act was enacted on June 20, 2014. For
the texts of the Reform Act see Cabinet Bill No. 22 for 185th Diet, SHÛGIIN SEITEI HÔRITSU,
available at http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_gian.nsf/html/gian/honbun/houan/g185050
22.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
2. Kaisha-ho [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005 (Japan) [hereinafter JCA], available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/CA1_4_2.pdf and http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/
seisaku/hourei/data/CA5_8.pdf (English translation of JCA as of Dec. 15, 2006).
3. Japan has achieved high scores in recent research regarding corporate governance
indices. See John Armour et al., Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An
Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis, 6 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 343, 357 (2009)
(Japan had the highest score for shareholder protection in 1996 and the fourth highest score
in 2005, out of 20 countries studied); Holger Spamann, The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 467, 475 (2010) (Japan earned five out of six points, the highest
score awarded in 1997 and second highest in 2005, both out of 46 countries).
4. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 865 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Power].
5.

Id. at 901-08.

6. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675,
701-04 (2007).
7.

Id. at 700-01.

8. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW.
43, 43 (2003).
9. See infra, Part II.
10. Japanese corporations are also well known for their stakeholder model with an
emphasis on the interest of employees. Gregory Jackson & Hideaki Miyajima, Introduction:
The Diversity and Change of Corporate Governance in Japan, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
IN JAPAN 1, 4 (Masahiko Aoki et al. eds., 2007).
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Japanese corporate law, but also for corporate law in countries like the
U.S., where the implementation of strong shareholder rights is debated.11
Part II of this Article examines in detail the strength of shareholder
rights under Japanese law in comparison to shareholder rights in the U.S.,
particularly under Delaware law, and then summarizes and categorizes the
characteristics of Japanese law into two groups: (i) strong class-based
rights with respect to decision-making, and (ii) strong individual rights to
raise derivative suits and shareholder proposals. Parts III and IV deal with
the first characteristic. Part III briefly summarizes hedge fund activism in
Japan and posits an explanation for the lack of support to activists from
other shareholders, especially those in so-called “cross-shareholding”
(kabushiki mochiai)12 relationships. Part III then reviews empirical studies
regarding the effects of hedge fund activism on certain corporations in Japan, analyzing the possibility and difficulty of regulating cross-shareholding relationships. The analysis suggests that shareholder rights would be
strengthened if there were no restraints imposed by cross-shareholdings.
Part IV considers the effect of shareholder rights when a corporation has
fewer cross-shareholdings and is held largely by institutional investors. Finally, Part V analyzes the pros and cons of the second characteristic of
Japanese law—shareholders’ strong individual rights, which are unaffected
by cross-shareholdings.
II. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS

UNDER

JAPANESE LAW

A. Overview
Shareholder rights can be divided into (i) the right to vote, (ii) the right
to sue, and (iii) the right to sell.13 This Article focuses on the first two of
11. For an opposing view to the notion of shareholder empowerment, see, for example, William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010). For rejoinder, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That
Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637 (2013).
12. “Cross-shareholding,” which refers to the situation in which two corporations hold
each other’s shares, is one of the characteristics of Japanese corporate governance. See
Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of Corporate Law
and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 210-11 (2000) (“The Japanese method of stabilizing management is through cross- shareholding. An implicit agreement is made between
two companies to hold ownership in the other partners’ stock, usually around one percent by
nonfinancial firms and up to five percent by banks. Each company makes the same type of
implicit agreements with, for example, twenty companies. Consequently, a spider web of mutual stockholding among inside shareholders is created, thereby stabilizing majority stock
ownership.”). In this article, however, the term cross-shareholding is used to include other
forms of shareholding relationships that have a similar effect, such as circular shareholdings
among three or more corporations or unilateral shareholding by a mutual insurance company. Cf. Akira Tokutsu, Mochiai kabushiki no hoteki chi-i (1) [Legal Status of Crossly-held
Shares (1)], 125 HOGAKU KYOKAI ZASSHI 455, 469 (2008) (stating that prior literature referring to cross-shareholding as the defining characteristic of Japanese share-ownership structure did not confine itself to literal mutual shareholding between two corporations).
13. WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 153 (4th ed. 2012).

Spring 2014]

Legally “Strong” Shareholders of Japan

129

those rights.14 The differences between U.S. corporate law, using Delaware law as its proxy, and Japanese corporate law can be categorized into
four points. First, the range of matters that may be decided at shareholders’ meetings is broader in Japan than in the U.S. Second, shareholders’
influence on the core operations of shareholders’ meetings—the election
and removal of directors—is stronger in Japan. Third, shareholders of Japanese corporations have a greater opportunity to affect corporate governance at shareholders’ meeting through shareholder proposals. And fourth,
turning from the right to vote to the right to sue, derivative suits are more
easily initiated and maintained in Japan. These are explained in greater
detail in the following sections.15
B. Broader Power of Shareholder Meetings
As a civil law country, Japanese law mirrors continental European law
in its grant of broad power to shareholders’ meetings, as compared to that
supplied by Delaware law.16
1. Charter Amendments
The largest difference in shareholder rights under Japanese and U.S.
law lies in the power to alter the fundamental structure of the corporation.
U.S. corporations are governed by two constitutional documents, namely,
the certificate or articles of incorporation and the bylaws, each with a different procedure for its amendment. Under Delaware law, any amendment to the certificate of incorporation must be proposed by the board of
directors and voted on at a shareholders’ meeting.17 The board, thus, has a
constructive veto power over amendments. Shareholders do have the
power to amend a corporation’s bylaws, but likely share this power with
the board. For example, if the certificate of incorporation permits, the
board may amend the bylaws without shareholder approval.18
14. Regarding the right to sell, although free transferability of shares is a common
feature of corporate laws in major jurisdictions, see REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 5 (2d ed. 2009),
there are differences in approaches to hostile takeovers, where the right to sell closely relates
to the right to vote. See id. at 233-56. This, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
15. Application of the JCA differs according to the organizational structure of a corporation. See ICHIRO KAWAMOTO, YASUHIRO KAWAGUCHI & TAKAYUKI KIHIRA, CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS IN JAPAN 214-18 (2012) (discussing variations in organizational
structure). Descriptions of Japanese law in the following parts of this article are based on the
rules applied to a public corporation (kokai gaisha), JCA art. 2(v), that adopts the structure
of a corporation with a board of statutory auditors (kansayakukai secchi gaisha), JCA art.
2(x), which is the structure adopted by the great majority of listed corporations in Japan.
16. For comparison of Delaware law and those of continental European countries, see
Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and Continental
Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 739-41 (2005).
17. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2011).
18. Id. § 109(a).
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By contrast, Japanese corporations are governed by a charter alone.
That is, there is no such distinction between certificates of incorporation
and bylaws. Furthermore, the only procedure necessary for a charter
amendment is an affirmative vote on a special resolution at a shareholders’ meeting.19 Shareholders need not obtain board consent to amend a
charter provision; rather, shareholders may amend the corporate charter
unilaterally.
2. Decision on Ordinary Business Matters
The procedural differences regarding charter amendments inherently
affects the board’s power to make decisions on ordinary business matters,
a power that belongs to the board as a default rule in both countries.20 In
Delaware, in order for the business and affairs of a corporation to be managed other than by the board, i.e. for this power to be reallocated to the
shareholders, the certificate of incorporation must contain, or be amended
to contain, such a provision,21 thereby making it impossible to deprive the
board of its power against its will. In Japan, a charter provision granting
shareholders the power to make decisions on ordinary business matters at
shareholders’ meetings22 can be introduced without consent of the board.
3. Dividends
The variation in the power to declare dividends is more apparent still.
In Delaware, the decision to make dividend payments rests in the hands of
the board, subject to any restrictions set forth in the certificate of incorporation.23 The default rule in Japan is the opposite: a shareholder resolution
is required to decide whether the corporation will pay dividends and, if so,
their amount.24 By way of charter amendment, however, shareholders can
either grant this power to the board as well25 or go further and divest
themselves fully of this power, making the board solely responsible for any
decisions about dividend payments.26
19. JCA art. 466. A special resolution is made by a majority of two thirds or more of
the votes of the shareholders present at the meeting, where the shareholders holding a majority of the votes of the shareholders entitled to exercise their votes at such shareholders’ meeting are present. See JCA art. 309(2).
20. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); JCA art. 362(2).
21. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a).
22. See JCA art. 295.
23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a).
24. JCA art. 454(1). Shareholders can also make a proposal regarding the amount of
dividends paid. See infra note 65 and accompanying texts.
25. JCA art. 459(1)(iv). This option is available only for a corporation that appoints an
outside auditor and the term of directors of which is not over one year.
26. JCA art. 460(1). The eligibility standard is the same as in JCA article 459(1). It has
been reported that, as of June 2006, which was the first annual shareholders’ meeting season
for Japanese listed corporations after JCA went into effect on May 1 of that year, 432 listed
corporations have granted their boards of directors the power to decide on dividends, and
330 of those corporations have divested their shareholders’ meetings of that power. Kaisha
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4. Executive Compensation
The differences under U.S. and Japanese law with respect to the power
to set executive compensation are rather subtle, particularly after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act.27 In the U.S., publicly traded corporations are now required to hold a
non-binding shareholder vote at least once every three years to approve
the compensation of the corporation’s CEO, CFO, and the three other
most highly compensated executive officers (the so-called “Say on
Pay”).28
In comparison, shareholders’ power to set executive compensation is
rather limited in Japan. Although the JCA stipulates that compensation of
“directors shall be fixed by resolution of a shareholders’ meeting[,]”29 case
law has limited the scope of this shareholder right, such that these resolutions create only a ceiling on the maximum aggregate compensation for
the corporation’s directors; the board may then divide this maximum aggregate compensation at its discretion.30 In addition, once the maximum
amount is set, a resolution of shareholders’ meeting is not necessary for as
long as the actual compensation fits within the specified maximum.31
Moreover, there is no mandatory disclosure of individual compensation,32
except for directors of publicly traded corporations receiving compensation of 100 million JPY or more.33
C. Greater Influence on Election and Removal of Directors
1. Election
To start, the standard for the election of directors is stricter in Japan,
especially in uncontested elections. The default rule in Delaware is a plurality standard,34 meaning that a candidate who receives more votes in her
ho kanren teikan henkou gian no jirei bunseki – Heisei 18 nen 6 gatsu sokai gaisha [Analysis
of Proposals for Charter Amendments Regarding Companies-Act Related Matters – For
Shareholders’ Meeting in June 2006], 272 SIRYOBAN SHOJI HOMU 56, 136 (2006). The total
number of corporations that amended their charters in June 2006 to adjust to the new act was
2029. Id. at 56. No comprehensive data is available on the current status of all listed corporations on this matter.
27. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1) (2012).
29. JCA art. 361(1).
30. Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Mar. 26, 1985, 1159 HANREI JIHÔ [HANJI] 150, 150.
31. Wataru Tanaka, 361 jyo [Article 361], in KAISHAHO KONMENTARU DAI 8 KAN
[COMMENTARIES ON COMPANIES ACT, VOL. 8] 145, 162 (Seiichi Ochiai ed., 2009).
32. Kaishaho Seko Kisoku [Ministerial Ordinance for Implementation of Companies
Act], Ministerial Ordinance No. 12 of 2006, art. 121, para. iii (Japan).
33. Kigyo naiyo to no kaiji ni kansuru naikaku furei [Cabinet Office Ordinance on
Disclosure of Corporate Affairs], Cabinet Office Ordinance No. 5 of 1973 (Japan) (Form 2
(Precautions for Recording (57)a(d)) and Form 3-2 (Precautions for Recording (14)).
34. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2011).
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favor than any other individual competitor will be elected as a director. In
uncontested elections, a candidate who runs unopposed will be elected,
even if she receives only a single vote in her favor, because there is no
other candidate who receives more votes. Shareholders may choose to
adopt a majority standard35 through a bylaw amendment,36 which the
board cannot further amend or repeal.37
In Japan, the default rule for director elections is a majority standard,
such that a candidate must receive the majority of votes cast in her favor,
regardless of whether the election is contested or uncontested.38 Thus, it is
possible for shareholders to vote down a candidate proposed by the management without proposing their own candidate. Also, the majority of all
voting rights entitled to vote must be present at the shareholders’ meeting
to represent a quorum.39 The quorum itself may be lowered to one third
by a charter provision, but the voting standard (i.e. majority versus plurality) can only be raised.40
2. Removal
Standards relating to the removal of directors arguably have an even
greater impact on shareholder rights than those governing their election.
As a rule, shareholders of Delaware corporations are entitled to remove
any particular director or the entire board, with or without cause, with the
affirmative vote of a majority of shares entitled to vote.41 When the board
is classified, however, removal is possible only for cause.42 Although the
declassification of the boards of publicly traded corporations, especially
those included in S&P 500 index, is becoming more common,43 classification remains a hurdle for shareholders of corporations with classified
boards.
35. Majority standard, which is the standard for all matters other then the election of
directors in Delaware, means that “the affirmative vote of the majority of shares present in
person or represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on the subject matter” is
necessary for the resolution of shareholders’ meeting. Id. § 216(2).
36. For a discussion of the state of shareholder activism in favor of the majority standard and recent adoption of some form of that standard by listed corporations, see Fabrizio
Ferri, ‘Low-Cost’ Shareholder Activism: A Review of the Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 192, 199-200 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell
eds., 2012).
37.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2011).

38.

JCA art. 341.

39.

Id.

40.

Id.

41.

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k).

42.

Id. § 141(k)(1).

43.

See LUCIAN BEBCHUK, SCOTT HIRST & JUNE RHEE, TOWARD BOARD DECLASSIFI100 S&P 500 AND FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES: REPORT OF THE SRP FOR THE 2012
AND 2013 PROXY SEASON 9, 15 (2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2400652.
CATION IN
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Japanese law is in sharp contrast to Delaware law. Shareholders of Japanese corporation can remove any director at any time by a majority of
votes cast.44 When there is no justifiable ground for such removal, the
corporation must pay damages arising from the removal to the director,45
but the removal itself stands. Because there is no exception to this rule,
there is little use to classifying a board in Japan.46
D. Greater Initiative at Shareholders’ Meetings
The greater power afforded shareholders of Japanese corporations
under Japanese law is complemented by the greater opportunity for shareholders to raise shareholder initiatives, which typically take the form of
proposals at shareholders’ meetings.47
1. Shareholder Proposals and Proxy Access
a. U.S.
In the U.S., shareholder proposals made to listed corporations are regulated by federal Proxy Rules under Section 14(a) of Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. According to Rule 14a-8, a shareholder who has continuously
held at least $2,000 in market value or one percent of the shares of a corporation for at least one year48 may submit no more than one proposal for
a particular shareholders’ meeting49 to be included in the proxy statement
44. JCA art. 339(1); id. art. 341. The same quorum requirement as for the election of
directors, i.e. the presence of the majority of all voting rights entitled to vote, applies here. Id.
art. 341. Under the Japanese Commercial Code, the predecessor to the JCA, a special resolution with two-thirds majority of the votes cast was necessary to effectuate removal. See
SHOHO [SHOHO] [COMM. C.] 1899, art. 257, paras. 1-2 (Japan).
45. JCA art. 339(2). The amount of this damage is normally the amount of compensation the director was entitled to receive during her term and at the end of her term had she
not been removed. KENJIRO EGASHIRA, KABUSHIKI GAISHA HO [LAWS OF STOCK CORPORATIONS] 372 n.7 (4th ed. 2011). The term of a director is typically two years, unless shortened
through a charter provision. See JCA art. 332(1).
46. Because the maximum term length for a director of a public corporation is two
years, JCA art. 332(1), it is possible to classify the board into two groups by asking one half
of directors to resign in the middle of their term and subsequently re-electing them, since a
director elected to fill the vacancy of a resigned director is granted a full two-year term when
no charter provision states otherwise. See Motohiro Sakaki, 332 jyo [Article 332], in
KAISHAHO KONMENTARU DAI 7 KAN [COMMENTARIES ON COMPANIES ACT, VOL. 7] 452, 463
(Shinsaku Iwahara ed., 2013). Such practice is rarely, if ever, seen in Japan. Rather, it is
customary to limit the term of the director elected to fill the vacancy to the remaining term of
the resigned director or that of the other directors. See, e.g., JAPAN TOBACCO, INC., TEIKAN
[CHARTER] art.22(2), available at http://www.jti.co.jp/investors/stock/articles/pdf/certificate.
pdf (last visited June 15, 2014).
47. See Cools, supra note 16, at 741 (noting the importance of the degree of shareholders’ initiative).
48.

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1) (2014).

49.

Id. § 240.14a-8(c).
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of the corporation. The length of the proposal may not exceed 500
words.50
Even when shareholder proposals meet the above requirements, the
corporation can exclude them from the proxy statement on 13 separate
grounds,51 many of which concern the subject matter of the proposal in
question. Notably, directors may exclude proposals that pertain to the corporation’s ordinary business operations,52 director elections,53 and specific
dividend payments.54 Delaware corporations can also exclude, as improper under state law, shareholder proposals that would bind the corporation if approved by shareholders.55 To avoid exclusion on this basis,
shareholders of Delaware corporations often draft their proposals as recommendations or suggestions.56 As such, the board may then ignore them,
even if the proposals obtain a majority of votes in favor.
The extension of shareholder access to the corporate proxy process in
relation to director elections has been on the forefront of the shareholder
empowerment debate for the last decade.57 The high watermark in recent
years was the adoption of Rule 14a-11 by the SEC in August 2010.58 This
rule, adopted in accordance with the authority granted by Section 971(b)
of the Dodd-Frank Act, required listed corporations to include in their
proxy statements either one candidate or candidates for 25 percent of the
board seats of the corporation, whichever was greater, nominated by any
shareholder or group of shareholders that held more than three percent of
the shares of the corporation for more than three years. In July 2011, however, this requirement was vacated by the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit,59 and the then-Chairwoman of the SEC, Mary Schapiro, stated in
50. Id. § 240.14a-8(d).
51. Id. § 240.14a-8(i).
52. Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(7).
53. Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (a proposal relating to director elections could be excluded
“[i]f the proposal: (i) [w]ould disqualify a nominee who is standing for election; (ii) [w]ould
remove a director from office before his or her term expired; (iii) [q]uestions the competence, business judgment, or character of one or more nominees or directors; (iv) [s]eeks to
include a specific individual in the company’s proxy materials for election to the board of
directors; or (v) [o]therwise could affect the outcome of the upcoming election of
directors.”).
54. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(13).
55. Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(1); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011) (“[t]he business and
affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors”); Ferri, supra note 36, at 203.
56. The Securities and Exchange Commission advises shareholders to do so. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) (Note to paragraph (i)(1)).
57. For a brief overview, see ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 13 at
200-02.
58. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16,
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249).
59. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The main ground
for vacatur was the SEC’s failure to consider adequately the rule’s effect upon efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.
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a congressional hearing held on April 25, 2012, that the SEC would not
propose a new proxy access rule.60 The adoption of proxy access is thus
left to each corporation via its bylaws.61
b. Japan
In sharp contrast yet again, Japanese law grants much greater proxy
access to shareholder proposals.62 The shareholding amount threshold
(the lesser of one percent of all voting rights or 300 voting rights) and the
duration of such shareholding (six months or more) necessary to make a
proposal are not very different from those in the U.S.63 The stark difference lies instead in following two points. First, there is no restriction on
the number of proposals that a shareholder can make.64 Second, and more
importantly, proxy access is granted to all proposals, so long as they are
60. Oversight of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Services, 112th
Cong. 14 (2012), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/112-119.pdf.
61. Delaware law allows corporate bylaws to grant shareholders proxy access for nomination of director candidates. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) prohibits exclusion from the proxy statement of a shareholder proposal for such a bylaw
amendment.
62. On the other hand, upon receipt of a shareholder proposal, the result is not terribly different from that in the U.S. Indeed, a corporation that receives a valid shareholder
proposal no less than eight weeks before the day of the shareholders’ meeting must similarly
include a summary of the proposal in its notice of calling of shareholders’ meeting. JCA arts.
305(1), 299(2)(3).
In addition, if the corporation permits its shareholders to exercise their voting rights in
writing, which is mandatory when the number of shareholders is 1000 or more, see JCA arts.
298(1)(iii), 298(2) (this does not apply to a listed corporation soliciting proxies, which is rare.
See KAWAMOTO, KAWAGUCHI & KIHIRA, supra note 15, at 230-31; JCA art. 298(2) proviso),
then the corporation must send a document to its shareholders stating (i) the matters of
reference for the exercise of shareholder voting rights at the shareholders’ meeting (reference document) and (ii) a document to be used by the shareholder to exercise the voting
rights (voting form). JCA art. 301(1). The contents of these documents are prescribed by
articles 65-66 and 73-94 of Ministerial Ordinance for Implementation of Companies Act. See
Kaishaho Seko Kisoku [Ministerial Ordinance for Implementation of Companies Act], Ministerial Ordinance No. 12 of 2006, arts. 65-66, 73-94 (Japan). With regard to shareholder proposals, the reference document must include specific information about the shareholder
proposals, such as the grounds for the proposal or the background of the candidate when the
proposal is a nomination of a director. Id. arts. 93(1)(iii)-(iv), 74. The corporation can summarize the information provided by the proposing shareholders when they are too lengthy to
include all of the proposals, and the voting form must provide a space for shareholders to
express approval or disapproval to the proposal. Id. art. 66(1)(i).
63. JCA art. 303(2) (shareholding necessary to make a proposal to include a certain
matter in the agenda of a shareholders’ meeting); id. art. 305(1) (shareholding necessary to
make a specific proposal on a certain agenda).
64. No article in JCA refers to the number of proposals permitted. Minoru Sawaguchi,
Kabunushi teianken no ima [Shareholder’s Proposal Right Today], 340 SIRYOBAN SHOJI
HOMU 18, 22 (2012). A recent judgment of the Tokyo High Court, however, acknowledged
the possibility that shareholder proposals could be considered an abuse of right and, therefore, illegal when the number of proposals is too large, although the court declined to find
abuse when a single shareholder had made 58 proposals. See Tokyo Koto Saibansho [Tokyo
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comprised of matters rightfully to be decided at shareholders’ meeting.65
As discussed in Part II.B, the powers granted shareholders at shareholders’ meetings is quite broad. For example, a proposal regarding specific
decisions about the corporation’s ordinary business operations will be permitted if it is conditioned on the approval of accompanying proposals for
amendments to the charter to grant shareholders’ meetings authority over
such matters.66 Furthermore, all director candidates nominated by shareholders must be included in the corporate proxy and ballot.67 This requirement goes far beyond the now-vacated SEC Rule 14a-11. The only real
exceptions to the broad Japanese proxy access are proposals in violation of
law or charter provisions and proposals essentially identical to a proposal
within the prior three years that received low affirmative votes (<ten
percent).68
2. Right to Call a Special Meeting
In keeping with the trend materializing, there is also a difference under
U.S. and Japanese law with respect to a shareholder’s right to call a special
meeting. Under Delaware law, only the board of directors may call special
meetings, unless either the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws grant
such a right to shareholders.69 In Japan, any shareholder holding three
percent or more of the corporation’s voting rights for six months or longer
can demand that the directors call a special meeting.70 When the board
delays in doing so, the shareholder can obtain court permission to call the
special meeting unilaterally.71 Because shareholders do not have to wait
for annual meetings to hold a vote on their proposals, the value and protective purposes of a classified board are greatly diminished in Japan,
while the value of a shareholder proposal is vastly increased.

High Ct.], May 31, 2012, 340 SIRYOBAN SHOJI
Part V.B, for issues arising from this point.

HOMU

[SHIRYOBAN SHOJI] 30; see also infra

65. See EGASHIRA, supra note 45, at 309 (stating that corporation does not need to put
a shareholder proposal regarding a matter that could not be decided at shareholders’ meeting
on agenda); id. at 310 n.4 (describing the U.S. rule as putting more restrictions on the subject
matter of proposals compared to Japan).
66. Shoichi Aotake, 303 jyo [Article 303], in KAISHAHO KONMENTARU DAI 7 KAN
[COMMENTARIES ON COMPANIES ACT, VOL. 7] 98, 101 (Shinsaku Iwahara ed., 2013).
67. For what a corporation should do when it receives a valid shareholder proposal,
see supra note 62.
68.

JCA art. 305(4).

69. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (2011). But see REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 7.02(a)(2) (2013) (granting the right to demand a special meeting to shareholders holding at
least ten percent of all votes).
70.

JCA art. 297(1).

71.

Id. art. 297(4)(i).
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E. Greater Initiative in Derivative Suits
1. U.S.
In principle, the decision to raise a claim on behalf of the corporation
against a third party belongs to the board of directors.72 Shareholder derivative suits are permitted as an exception to this rule, however, since
sometimes the board decision not to sue is biased and ought not be protected as a business judgment.73 A typical case of this kind is one dealing
with a claim against a director for liability arising from her breach of fiduciary duties.
U.S. law imposes the following requirements and restrictions on derivative suits, which are to be assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether the suit is truly in the best interest of the corporation:
First, a shareholder must make a pre-suit demand to the board of directors in order to let the board decide whether a suit is in the best interest
of the corporation.74 Only when the board’s refusal of the demand was
wrongful or the demand requirement was excused due to its futility can a
shareholder raise a derivative suit.75
Second, even when the plaintiff shareholder passes the above hurdles
and raises a derivative suit, the corporation may still seek its dismissal
when a special litigation committee consisting of independent and disinterested directors makes a recommendation that the suit is not in the corporation’s best interest.76 In Delaware, the court will then decide whether to
follow this recommendation, pursuant to the standard established in
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado.77
Third, there are two standing requirements, the purposes of which are
to select a plaintiff who will carry out the derivative suit in conformity with
the interest of the shareholders as a class. The contemporaneous ownership requirement dictates that the complaint “allege that the plaintiff was
a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction complained
of[.]”78 The plaintiff must also “fairly and adequately represent the interests of shareholders or members who are similarly situated in enforcing
the right of the corporation or association.”79 Courts consider any conflict
of interest between the plaintiff and other shareholders, among other factors, in determining the adequacy of the named plaintiff.80
72.
73.
74.

See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a).
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 187 (2d ed. 2009).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3); DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(a).

75. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 73, at 203-11.
76. Id. at 211-16.
77. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
78. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(1).
79. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a). Rule 23.1(b) of the Delaware Court of Chancery includes
more specific provisions restraining the receipt of compensation by the representative plaintiff, in lieu of the phrase cited in the text above. See DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(b).
80. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 73 at 199-201.
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As long as these requirements are met, shareholders of American corporations can raise a derivative suit for claims on behalf of the corporation, including but not limited to claims against directors and officers for
breaches of their fiduciary duties.81 In other words, derivative suits against
directors and officers are addressed within the same framework as derivative suits for other claims.
2. Japan
Japanese law on shareholder derivative suits82 starts from the same
point, that shareholder derivative suits are permitted as an exception to
the general rule that the decision to raise a claim on behalf of the corporation belongs to the board of directors,83 but then takes an approach that
could be characterized as formalistic and categorical, as opposed to the
substantive and case-by-case approach of the U.S.84 The scope of the Japanese derivative suit is limited to those claims listed exhaustively by statute,85 which the law regarded as claims that are especially likely to be
under-enforced by corporate management.86 Within this limited field,
however, plaintiff shareholders face fewer restrictions.
First, although a shareholder seeking to file a derivative suit against a
director must demand that the corporation sue the director in the first
place,87 the shareholder can bring a suit herself if the corporation does not
sue the director within 60 days of that demand.88 There is no need to establish that there was a wrongful refusal or that making the demand was
futile.

81.

Id. at 187 n.1.

82. See Hiroshi Oda, Shareholder’s Derivative Action in Japan, 8 EUR. CO. & FIN. L.
REV. 334, 341-47 (2011), for a more detailed description of Japanese law on derivative suits.
83.

See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying texts.

84. Tomotaka Fujita, Kabunushi daihyo sosho no gendaiteki tenkai [Development of
Shareholder’s Derivative Suit of Today], in KAISHA JIKEN TETSUDUKIHO NO GENDAITEKI
TENKAI [DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR CORPORATE LITIGATION OF
TODAY] 41-44 (Shiro Kawashima & Masafumi Nakahigashi eds., 2013).
85. JCA art. 847(1) (listing the following claims: claims for the liability of an incorporator, director at incorporation, statutory auditor at incorporation, director, accounting advisor, statutory auditor, executive officer, accounting auditor or liquidator; claims for the
return of the benefits set forth in Article 120(3); or claims for the payment under the provisions of Article 212(1) or Article 285(1)).
86. This does not mean that the list of Article 847(1) is perfect. There are other types
of claims that are also very likely to be under-enforced but not included in this list, such as
claims for liability of controlling shareholder or senior employees.
87.

JCA art. 847(1).

88.

Id. art. 847(3).
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Second, once the plaintiff shareholder raises a derivative suit, a court
cannot dismiss the suit with a reference to the decision of corporation’s
special litigation committee.89
Third, the only standing requirement for a plaintiff is the consecutive
holding of at least one share90 for the preceding six months or more.91
Since there is no contemporaneous ownership requirement, it is possible
to purchase a share after one notices wrongdoing by a director and to raise
a derivative suit six months thereafter. Additionally, there is no fair and
adequate representation requirement; however, a derivative suit will be
dismissed if the plaintiff’s purpose is to seek unlawful gains or inflict damage on the corporation.92
Thus, derivative suits in Japan are both easier to initiate and harder to
dismiss.
F. Summary
To summarize, the rights of shareholders of Japanese corporations are
strong in two ways. First, as a class, shareholders have substantial ability
and opportunity to influence corporate decision-making. Second, they also
have strong individual rights to raise issues either via proposals or derivative suits.
Although shareholders of Japanese corporations lack some rights present under other countries’ corporate law scheme, such as class action for
direct suits, it is fair to say that shareholders’ rights under Japanese law are
among the strongest in the world.93 The problem, then, is not the rights
themselves, but what has been done with them.

89. Fujita, supra note 84, at 43-44 (stating that Japanese law does not have a system to
allow the courts to dismiss derivative suits that are not in the interests of the corporation or
shareholders as a class on a case-by-case basis).
90. In contrast, the standing requirement for multiple derivative suits, which is to be
introduced by the Reform Act of the Companies Act, is set at one percent of the shares
issued. For background on this reform, see Goto, supra note 1, at 35-36.
91.

JCA art. 847(1).

92.

Id.

93. In Continental European countries, shareholders enjoy strong class-based rights
with respect to decision-making, see Cools, supra note 16 at 736-750, but shareholder derivative suits are limited. See generally Martin Gelter, Why Do Shareholder Derivative Suits Remain Rare in Continental Europe?, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 843 (2012). Similarly, in the U.K.,
shareholders have strong class-based rights with respect to decision-making, see Companies
Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 168, 303 (Eng.), but derivative suits require permission from the courts.
See id. § 261(1). Permission must be refused when the court is satisfied that a person acting in
accordance with the duty to promote the success of the company would not seek to continue
the claim. Id. § 263(2)(a).
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CROSS-SHAREHOLDINGS

A. A Brief History of Hedge Fund Activism in Japan
One type of investor that could leverage these strong shareholder
rights is a hedge fund, as such funds often own large blocks of stock and
are sophisticated enough to launch activism campaigns. In Japan, however,
hedge fund activism94 is rather infrequent today, though it experienced a
short period of heightened activity in the early-to-mid 2000s.95
Three hedge funds stood out during this period for their confrontational attitude against incumbent management teams: M&A Consulting
(a.k.a. the Murakami Fund), Steel Partners Japan (SPJ), and The Children’s Investment Fund (TCI).96 Their tactics often involved making public requests for higher payouts via dividends or share repurchases or
initiating tender offers against cash-rich corporations, which, too, often ended in some form of payout.97 These techniques were quite successful at
first.98 The style of activism soon invoked strong opposition,99 however,
and later interventions by the hedge funds into corporation management,
particularly those commenced by SPJ and TCI after late 2004, turned out
to be unsuccessful.100 For several years following the financial crisis of
2008, there was even a near-complete stoppage of hedge fund activism,
stemming from a worldwide shortage of funds caused by the withdrawal of
institutional investors.101
In recent years, U.S. activist hedge funds have returned to their previous level of activity;102 Japan has not seen the same rebound. Although at
94. Hedge fund activism is a kind of shareholder activism that purports to generate
profit by changing the strategic or financial policies of the targeted corporation. BUCHANAN,
DOMINIC HEESANG CHAI & SIMON DEAKIN, HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM IN JAPAN – THE LIMITS
OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 67-68 (2012). There are two other kinds of shareholder activism.
One focuses on improvement of corporate governance. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock,
Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021,
1042-44 (2007). The other focuses on promotion of social, political or environmental values.
See, e.g., infra note 219 (derivative suits by NPO holding shares to correct illegal corporate
activities); infra note 205 (shareholder proposal to abolish nuclear power plants by environmental activists holding shares of an electric power company).
95. For a thorough description of the rise and fall of hedge fund activism in Japan, see
BUCHANAN, CHAI & DEAKIN, supra note 94, at 153-293.
96. See id. at 154, 173-74, 180-82 (describing the funds mentioned).
97. Id. at 154-57, 174-77, 182-83.
98. Id. at 158-62, 175, 209.
99. Id. at 289-93 (depicting attempts, coined as “quiet” activism, of foreign hedge
funds to avoid such criticism and opposition by refraining from making public challenges to
management).
100. Id. at 209.
101. BUCHANAN, CHAI & DEAKIN, supra note 94, at 180.
102. See John J. Madden, The Evolving Direction and Increasing Influence of Shareholder Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 23, 2013, 9:18
AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/12/23/the-evolving-direction-and-increasinginfluence-of-shareholder-activism/; Martin Lipton, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds, HARV.
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least two cases of hedge fund activism were reported in 2013103—TCI’s
intervention against Japan Tobacco104 and Third Point’s intervention
against Sony105—confrontational activism is still rare. Whether this trend
will continue is difficult to predict at the moment.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 21, 2013, 12:24 PM), http://blogs.
law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/11/21/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds-2/.
103. Although the conflict between Cerberus and Seibu Holdings, Inc. attracted ample
public attention in the first half of 2013, this conflict was different from ordinary hedge fund
activism: Seibu was a non-listed corporation at that time; Cerberus was originally a friendly,
large shareholder holding 32 percent of Seibu’s shares; and Cerberus supported Seibu’s recovery after it was delisted from the Tokyo Stock Exchange for misstatements regarding
shareholdings of the founder’s family. Since Seibu was a delisted corporation, the holding
ratio of other institutional investors was presumably low. A conflict arose when Cerberus
opposed management’s early application for re-listing, since it would not produce enough
return for Cerberus to exit. In turn, Cerberus is said to have proposed the abolition of unprofitable railroad routes and the sale of a professional baseball team in order to raise
Seibu’s share price. Although Cerberus itself denied making these proposals, this invited
strong opposition from Seibu’s management and (mostly negative) public attention. Cerberus’ attempted tender offer to raise its stake to 45 percent and proxy fight for director seats
both eventually failed. Despite the initial expectation that this ongoing conflict would end
with Cerberus’s exit upon Seibu’s re-listing, which occurred on April 23, 2014, Cerberus still
holds Seibu shares as of June 2014, choosing not to sell because of the low IPO price. Ritsuko
Ando, Cerberus Pulls Out of Seibu IPO as Price Slashed, REUTERS (Apr. 9, 2014, 8:21 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/09/us-seibu-hldg-ipo-idUSBREA380WG20140409.
104. Since June 2011, just after the Eastern Japan Great Earthquake, TCI has been
requesting higher payouts from Japan Tobacco. BUCHANAN, CHAI & DEAKIN, supra note 94,
at 287-89. Indeed, TCI made shareholder proposals at the annual meetings in 2012 and 2013,
though both proposals were ultimately rejected. See JAPAN TOBACCO, INC., RINJI
HOUKOKUSHO [EXTRAORDINARY REPORT] (2012), available at http://www.jti.co.jp/investors/
securities_report/pdf/rinji20120627.pdf; JAPAN TOBACCO, INC., RINJI HOUKOKUSHO [EXTRAORDINARY REPORT] (2013), available at http://www.jti.co.jp/investors/securities_report/
pdf/rinji20130624.pdf. JT, nonetheless, has increased its payouts to shareholders. See Japan
Tobacco: Turning Over a New Leaf, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 2, 2013), http://www.economist.
com/news/business/21572778-activist-hedge-fund-helps-light-up-old-gasper-turning-over-new
-leaf. Further, in 2013, the Japanese Government decreased its shareholding of JT from 50.01
percent to 33.35 percent in order to meet its expenditure needs after the earthquake. Id.; see
also JAPAN TOBACCO, INC., DAI 28 KI YUKA SHOKEN HOKOKUSHO [ANNUAL REPORT FOR
THE 28TH BUSINESS YEAR] 35, 56 (2013), available at http://www.jti.co.jp/investors/securities_
report/pdf/f.s.20130621.pdf. Such reduction of governmental shareholding was also a part of
TCI’s request. BUCHANAN, CHAI & DEAKIN, supra note 94, at 288.
105. Third Point requested that Sony Corporation, which is well-known for adopting an
American-style corporate governance, list its entertainment division and restructure its electronics division. Letter of Daniel S. Loeb, Chief Exec. Officer, Third Point LLC, to Kazuo
Hirai, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Sony Corp. (May 14, 2013), available at http://
online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ThirdPointLettertoSony.pdf. Although Sony rejected the request for partial listing of its entertainment division, the corporation did begin to
provide additional information on its entertainment division, announce that it would sell its
personal computer business, and restructure its TV business. Press Release, Sony Corp., Sony
Corporation Sends Letter to Third Point (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/News/
Press/201308/13-091E/; Press Release, Sony Corp., Sony Announces Plans to Address Reform of PC and TV Businesses (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/News/Press/
201402/14-0206E/. One might conclude that this is a partial response to Third Point’s request.
Third Point was not listed among the 10 largest shareholders of Sony as of December 31,
2013, but Third Point might still hold its investment through swap arrangements. See Kana
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B. The Cause of Failure: Cross-Shareholding
Putting aside the possibility of future developments, hedge fund activism seems to have largely failed as a sustainable investment strategy thus
far.106 This is due, in part, to strong resistance from the incumbent management teams of targeted corporations.107 But, why couldn’t this resistance be countered by the strong legal rights of shareholders of Japanese
corporations?
The answer is simple. In order to use these rights, activist hedge funds,
who rarely own a controlling stake by themselves, needed to obtain sufficient support from other shareholders.108 The ultimate cause of the failure
of activist hedge funds in Japan is the lack of this support,109 which is more
readily available for activists in the U.S.
One particular subset of shareholders that perpetually show no support
for these activists are those in cross-shareholding relationships.110 Crossshareholders consist of banks, insurance companies, and other business
companies that are typically engaged in some sort of business transaction
with the issuer corporation. Because their interest is in maintaining this
business relationship, rather than dividends and capital gains,111 they generally support the incumbent management from whom they earn business,
rather than activist shareholders.
Even individual shareholders that have no such relationship with the
corporation sometimes deny their support to hedge funds. A famous example is the Bulldog Sauce case,112 in which almost all shareholders other
than SPJ approved a defensive maneuver against a hostile tender offer
with a premium113, even though implementing that defensive plan came at
a substantial cost to these same shareholders.114 Since it was financially
Inagaki & Juliet Chung, Dan Loeb’s Third Point Drops Out of Sony’s Top 10 Biggest Holders, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2014, 12:35 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/02/18/danloebs-third-point-drops-out-of-sonys-top-10-biggest-holders/. It is of great interest whether
Third Point will take further action at Sony’s 2014 annual shareholders meeting.
106. BUCHANAN, CHAI & DEAKIN, supra note 94, at 307.
107. Id. at 298-300.
108. Kahan & Rock, supra note 94, at 1088-89.
109. BUCHANAN, CHAI & DEAKIN, supra note 94, at 252.
110. For definition of “cross-shareholding” in this Article, see supra note 12.
111. Id. (regarding shareholding by life insurance companies). See also infra note 155159 and accompanying texts (discussing rationales of cross-shareholding in Japan).
112. Saikô Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Aug. 7, 2007, 61 SAIKÔ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHÛ
[MINSHÛ] 2215 (Japan), discussed in Hiroshi Oda, Comment, in BUSINESS LAW IN JAPAN –
CASES AND COMMENTS – INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, CIVIL, COMMERCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 323 (Moritz Bälz et al. eds., 2012).
113. The shareholder meeting of Bulldog Sauce approved the defensive plan by 88.7
percent of the voting rights present at the meeting and by 83.4 percent of all voting rights,
whereas SPJ claimed to hold about 10.5 percent. Saikô Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Aug. 7, 2007, 61
SAIKÔ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHÛ [MINSHÛ] 2221, 2228 (Japan).
114. Id. at 2221-22. The defense plan diluted the position of SPJ—the hostile bidder in
this case—by allocating share options, which could be exercised to receive three new shares
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irrational for individual shareholders to approve this defensive plan, it
seems logical to conclude that they had strong sympathy for the targeted
corporation and antipathy to the hostile bidder.115 In other words, shareholder hostility towards activist hedge funds is not always guaranteed;
rather, it seems to depend on how a hedge fund behaves publicly.116
In their reflections on the issue, Buchanan, Chai & Deakin have asserted that neither domestic nor foreign institutional investors have always
supported activists,117 yet failed to specify cases in which foreign investors
denied their support.118 Such a denial might occur when, for example, an
activist hedge fund requests higher dividends.119 However, this kind of opposition is not unreasonable, compared to the adoption of the defensive
plan in the Bull-Dog Sauce case, since investors might reasonably disagree
as to their projections on the amount of free cash flow and the investment
opportunities of the targeted corporation.120
per share, to each existing share, including those held by SPJ, but prohibiting SPJ from exercising these options. SPJ was financially compensated for this loss by the repurchase of its
options by the corporation. Id. Thus, the non-SPJ shareholders not only eliminated their
opportunity to receive the premium offered by SPJ, but also had to bear the cost of this
compensation to SPJ.
115. Wataru Tanaka, Kabushiki hoyu kozo to kaisha-ho – Bunsan hoyu no jyojyo gaisha
no jirenma wo koete [Share-Ownership Structure and Corporate Law – Beyond the “Dilemma
of Dispersedly-Held Listed Corporations”], 2007 SHOJI HOMU 30, 39 n.18 (2013); see also
Peng Xu & Wataru Tanaka, Baishu boeisaku in za shado obu kabushiki mochiai – jirei
kenkyu [Takeover Defense in the Shadow of Cross-Shareholdings – A Case Study], 1885 SHOJI
HOMU 4, 10-13 (2009).
116. Joseph Chang, Shareholder activism in Japan on the rise, but change will be difficult, ICIS CHEM. BUS. (Nov. 5, 2007), http://www.icis.com/resources/news/2007/11/05/9075
289/shareholder-activism-in-japan-on-the-rise-but-change-will-be-difficult/ (reporting that
Warren Lichtenstein, CEO of Steel Partners, stated at a press conference in Tokyo that his
intent was to “educate” and “enlighten” Japanese corporate managers); see also BUCHANAN,
CHAI & DEAKIN, supra note 94, at 274-76, 281 (describing popular media coverage in Japan,
which was often negative). But see Loeb, supra note 105, at 1 (Third Point is seemingly trying
to avoid this antipathy by emphasizing that their proposals to Sony are based on “a spirit of
partnership”).
117. BUCHANAN, CHAI & DEAKIN, supra note 94, at 280, 311.
118. Id. at 257-59 (raising only examples of support by foreign investors); see also id. at
255-57 (citing a general concern by Japanese fund managers with regard to the excessiveness
of SPJ and an implied preference for the autonomy of the board of directors on dividend
payments).
119. Compare JAPAN TOBACCO, INC., ANNUAL SHAREHOLDERS’ MEETING 3 (2013),
available at http://www.jti.co.jp/investors/securities_report/pdf/rinji20130624.pdf (TCI’s proposal for higher dividends and share repurchases obtained only 20 percent to 22 percent of
the votes cast), with JAPAN TOBACCO, INC., ANNUAL REPORT 2013 (2013), available at http://
www.jt.com/investors/results/annual_report/pdf/annual2013_E_all.pdf (showing that 33.5 percent of the outstanding shares were held by foreign institutions).
120. For example, it has been reported that Institutional Shareholders Services has recommended that shareholders of Apple, Inc. vote against the proposal for a $50 billion share
repurchase by Carl Icahn. David Benoit, Apple Gets Backing Against Icahn Proposal - Proxy
Adviser ISS Recommends Against Investor’s Stock-Buyback Resolution, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 9,
2014, 6:41 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023038745045793734435
07730608; see also Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a
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The following sections will focus on cross-shareholdings as the main
cause of hedge fund activism failure.
C. Unwinding Cross-Shareholding
1. General Trend
Is cross-shareholding a problem in Japan? Graph 1121 below shows the
share-ownership distribution by investor category of all listed corporations
in Japan on an aggregate basis over time.
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The three categories of investors on the left side of each row, namely,
non-financial business corporations, banks, and insurers, are “insider
shareholders” that tend to support the incumbent management. These investors can be approximated to shareholders in a cross-shareholding relationship. The three categories on the far right side of the graph, namely,
individuals, foreigners, and trust banks,122 are “outsider shareholders”
that may support activist hedge funds.
Sequential Decision Model, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 610, 620 (2013) (reporting relatively low rate of
success of activism—including in those corporations that hedge funds exited before going
into proxy fights—when hedge funds demand higher dividends).
121. Graph 1 is based on data from the Tokyo Stock Exchange. See TOKYO STOCK
EXCHANGE, 2012 SHAREOWNERSHIP SURVEY, SHARE DISTRIBUTION SURVEY § 2-5, http://
www.tse.or.jp/english/market/data/shareownership/b7gje60000003t0u-att/2-5.xls (last visited
Feb. 28, 2014).
122. Shareholding by trust banks consists of shareholding for beneficiaries, such as investment trusts (mutual funds), private pension trusts, and other domestic investment funds,
and shareholding for trust banks’ own account. Although the exact proportion of these two
categories are unknown, it is reasonable to assume that the ratio of shares held for trust
banks’ own account has been considerably low in recent years, since the restrictions on share-
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The percentage shareholding held by insider shareholders, which was
as high as 61.8 percent in 1986, has decreased to 31.2 percent in 2012.
Cross-shareholdings are being unwound. The largest period of decline
took place in the late 1990’s, caused mainly by the banking crisis of 19971998 and subsequent regulation123 forcing banks to sell their shares of
other corporations.124 Insurers that were in a similar distressed situation
also sold their shares,125 although they were not subject to the regulation
noted above.
Correspondingly, the ratio of outsider shareholders has increased to
65.9 percent as of 2012. Greater holdings by foreign investors and trust
banks are the cause of trend. Although, by appearances, the unwinding of
cross-shareholdings seems to have stopped or largely slowed since 2005,126
the other side of the coin is that cross-shareholdings simply no longer seem
commonplace.
2. Diversified Unwinding
The above observation, however, is based on the aggregate data of all
listed corporations, calculated from market share price, the upshot of
which is that Graph 1 tends to over-emphasize the figures of corporations
with large market capitalizations. Research on a corporation-to-corporation basis has shown that there is diversification between large corporations and small and medium corporations with respect to the degree of
cross-shareholding unwinding. There are several reasons for this.
First, when banks were forced to sell their shares of other corporations,
they began with those of corporations with larger market capitalization
and higher market valuation,127 refraining when possible from selling
holdings by banks, see infra note 119, apply only to the shares held for trust banks’ own
account. Ginko to no kabushiki to no hoyu no seigen to ni kansuru naikaku furei [Cabinet
Office Ordinance on Restriction of Shareholdings by Banks], Cabinet Office Ordinance No.
4 of 2002, art. 2, para. 1, subpara. ii.
123. Ginko to no kabushiki to no hoyu no seigen to ni kansuru horitsu [Act on Restriction of Shareholdings by Banks], Law No. 131 of 2001, art. 3, para. 1 (Japan) (prohibiting
banks from holding shares of other corporations in excess of the bank’s capital).
124. Hideaki Miyajima & Fumiaki Kuroki, The Unwinding of C-Shareholding in Japan:
Causes, Effects, and Implications, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN 79, 90-91
(Masahiko Aoki et al. eds., 2007).
125. Id. at 90.
126. Hideaki Miyajima, Takuji Saito, Peng Xu, Wataru Tanaka & Ryo Ogawa, Nihongata koporeto gabanansu ha dokohe mukaunoka (jyo) - “Nihon kigyo no koporeto gabanansu
ni kansuru anketo” chosa kara yomitoku [Quo Vadis Japanese Corporate Governance? – Analyzing the Results of “Questionnaire on Corporate Governance of Japanese Corporations” (1
of 2)], 2008 SHOJI HOMU 4, 9 (2013).
127. Miyajima & Kuroki, supra note 124 at 99, 102. It is also worth noting that corporations that had their shares sold by banks tended to sell the shares of those banks within the
same or following year. Id. at 104. This tendency towards reciprocal share selling explains
another finding by Miyajima: that the unwinding of cross-shareholdings took place primarily
between banks and non-financial business corporations and less so among non-financial business corporations, since non-financial business corporations did not face the regulatory pres-
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shares of corporations that were dependent on them for borrowing, especially those in main-bank relationships.128
Second, foreign investors tend to prefer to invest in larger corporations
with higher ratios of overseas sales and higher return on assets, presumably because they are more familiar with them, thereby replacing banks as
shareholders of such corporations.129 This movement is slower in small
and medium corporations, where no such preference is apparent.
Third, after 2005, there was a limited revival of cross-shareholding
among non-financial business companies. The stunted return of crossshareholding was especially pronounced among cash-rich corporations
that were targeted by activist hedge funds.130
The data indicate that the unwinding of cross-shareholding and the increase of foreign investment is taking place primarily in large public corporations, while small and medium-sized listed corporations still seem to
have a relatively high ratio of cross-shareholdings and lower percentage of
shareholding by foreign investors.131 And, since activist hedge funds tend
to target smaller corporations in which less cash is needed to obtain a considerable stake,132 the impact of cross-shareholding on hedge fund activism is still quite large.

sure to sell other corporations’ shares that banks did. Hideaki Miyajima & Keisuke Nitta,
Kabushiki shoyu kozo no tayoka to sono kiketsu – Kabushiki mochiai no kaisyo / “fukkatsu”
to kaigai toshika no yakuwari [Diversification of Share-Ownership Structure and its Consequences / Unwinding and “Revival” of Cross-Shareholdings and the Role of Foreign Investors], in NIHON NO KIGYO TOCHI [CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN] 105, 120-21 (Hideaki
Miyajima ed., 2011); supra note 123-124 and accompanying texts.
128. Miyajima & Kuroki, supra note 124 at 102. A “main bank,” which is another characteristic of Japanese corporate governance, is the largest single lender to a corporation and
often one of its principal shareholders. From such a relationship, a main bank is expected, at
least traditionally, to monitor the borrower corporation’s management and to provide assistance in case the corporation becomes financially troubled. CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & MARK D.
WEST, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: THE IMPACT
OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULES 13 (2004). The behavior mentioned in the text could be
considered an attempt to avoid giving the market a negative impression that a corporation is
being abandoned, even by its main bank. Miyajima & Nitta, supra note 127, at 122.
129. Miyajima & Nitta, supra note 127, at 135; see also Miyajima & Kuroki, supra note
124, at 86-88.
130. Id. at 117, 125-30; see also Xu & Tanaka, supra note 115, at 8-10 (describing BullDog Sauce’s attempt to strengthen cross-shareholdings).
131.

Tanaka, supra note 115, at 31-32.

132. Kotaro Inoue & Hideaki Kato, Akuthibisuto fando no kozai [Merits and Demerits
of Activist Funds], 58 KEIZAI KENKYU 203, 207-08 (2007). Buchanan, Chai & Deakin report
that corporations targeted by confrontational hedge funds had “higher market capitalization
than their peers,” BUCHANAN, CHAI & DEAKIN, supra note 94, at 197, but these “peers” are
chosen from corporations in the same industry type with closest total assets and book-tomarket ratio. Id. at 193.
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D. Effects of Hedge Fund Activism on Japanese Targets
Should cross-shareholding be regulated in order to increase hedge fund
activism in Japan? The answer to this question depends on the effect of
activism on the firm value of targeted corporations. Although empirical
research on this point, especially on the long-term effects of activism, is
relatively scarce in Japan,133 a small number of existing studies have found
positive effects.
1. Inoue & Kato134
By examining the stock market return of corporations targeted by activist hedge funds during 2000-2006,135 Inoue & Kato sought to determine
whether activist hedge funds increase shareholder value by disciplining
targeted corporations, or whether they simply make profits from exiting
quickly after increasing the targeted corporation’s share price.136
The authors found that the cumulative abnormal return (CAR)137
upon activist hedge funds’ acquisition of more than five percent of the
shares was positive and statistically significant.138 For the cases in which
activists have exited, corporations targeted by activists other than
Murakami Fund experienced significantly positive CAR for the entirety of
the activist investment period.139 On the other hand, the targets of
133. For empirical studies about the effects of hedge fund activism in the U.S., see, for
example, LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK, ALON BRAV & WEI JIANG, THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF
HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291577, and Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge
Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008). For
refutation of the first article, see Martin Lipton, Empiricism and Experince; Activism and
Short-Termism; the Real World of Business, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE &
FIN. REG. (Oct. 28, 2013, 9:40 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/10/28/
empiricism-and-experience-activism-and-short-termism-the-real-world-of-business/.
134. Inoue & Kato, supra note 132.
135. This method is similar to the one employed in Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas,
supra note 133, at 1755-57, 1760-62.
136. Inoue & Kato, supra note 132, at 205-06.
137. CAR, which is a metric often used in financial studies to measure the effect of a
certain event to the shareholder value of a corporation, is the sum of the differences between
the actual performance of the share of that corporation and the expected return from that
share in the absence of the event in question. See RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK,
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 193-204 (2d ed. 1995). In this research by Inoue & Kato, however, CAR was calculated as the sum of the differences between
the actual performance of the shares of the targeted corporations and those of matched nontargeted corporations selected by industry type and size of market capitalization, since it was
difficult to obtain sufficient data from the period unaffected by the activists’ purchase to
calculate reliable expected returns of the shares of targeted corporations. This difficulty was
caused by the fact that most of these targeted corporations had smaller market capitalizations
and were not traded frequently. Inoue & Kato, supra note 132, at 207; see also id. at 210, 215
n.9.
138. Id. at 210-11.
139. Id. at 211.
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Murakami Fund, which tended to exit its investments in the relatively
short period of just over one year,140 experienced negative CAR during
the investment period, though these findings were not statistically significant.141 Finally, there was no apparent significant negative CAR around,
or for 100 days after, the exits of the activists studied.142
The fact that the initial positive CAR did not reverse suggests that
these activists have, in fact, created some value for shareholders.143
2. Buchanan, Chai & Deakin144
The more recent study by Buchanan, Chai & Deakin focused on the ex
post effects (i.e., 1 and 2 years later) of hedge fund activism on targeted
corporations as of December 31, 2007,145 the date the authors regard as
the peak of hedge fund activism in Japan.146 They divided their samples
into two categories: targets of confrontational activists (i.e., SPJ and TCI)
and those of non-confrontational activists.147 The focus here is on the
former.
In comparison to matched corporations selected by industry type,
amount of total assets, and book-to-market ratio,148 corporations targeted
by confrontational activists experienced a greater increase in ROA from
2007 to 2009, which was statistically significant at a ten percent level.149
The higher increase of ROA achieved by these activist targets was caused,
presumably, by a statistically significant increase in dividend payments by
these corporations, using their cash reserves.150 Although the level of significance is low, this result suggests the positive contribution of hedge fund
activism to decreasing the agency costs of free cash flow.
At the same time, corporations targeted by confrontational activists
experienced a larger decline of Tobin’s q than their matched counterparts
in both 2008 and 2009.151 Buchanan, Chai & Deakin themselves interpret
140.
141.
142.
143.
just good
144.

Id. at 209.
Id. at 211.
Inoue & Kato, supra note 132, at 211.
Id. at 212-13 (denying the possibility that activists other than Murakami Fund are
at picking undervalued shares).
BUCHANAN, CHAI & DEAKIN, supra note 94.

145. Id. at 325-30 tbl.A.3 (listing the corporations studied).
146. Id. at 166 (focusing the research on this point in time excluded the corporations
targeted by Murakami Fund, which terminated its investment activities in late 2006 following
the arrest of its CEO).
147. Id. at 192.
148. Id. at 193.
149. Id. at 199-203 (also showing no significant effect on ROE in 2009, nor on ROA or
ROE in 2008).
150. BUCHANAN, CHAI & DEAKIN, supra note 94, at 204. If the higher increase of ROA
was caused by the increase of profits, then not only ROA but also Tobin’s q should have
increased, which is not observed. See infra text accompanying note 151.
151. Id. at 199. Tobin’s q, which is a metric often used in financial studies to measure
current and future profitability of a firm, is the ratio of the market value of a firm to the
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this as a negative response of the stock market to confrontational hedge
fund activism.152 In my view, however, this larger decline of Tobin’s q for
activist targets was caused by the larger drop in share prices experienced
by these corporations during this period. This relatively larger decrease in
share price was, in turn, the result of having had higher than average share
prices in December 2007 in anticipation of further hedge fund activist intervention being wiped away by the 2008 financial crisis. Thus, the decline
of Tobin’s q should not imply negative effects of hedge fund activism on
the target’s firm value.
E. Regulating Cross-Shareholding
Although one should be careful to derive a definite conclusion from
limited empirical research, it may not be unfair to assume from the discussion above that hedge fund activism does have some positive effects on the
firm value. The next step is to find a workable regulation of cross-shareholding, which is not an easy task, as explained in the following section.
1. Prohibition
One option would be to create an outright prohibition on cross-shareholding. Besides the possibility of circumvention,153 such regulation might
well also face considerable opposition.154 Indeed, cross-shareholding is regarded as a useful method of strengthening mutual trust between business
partners in the Japanese business community.
A popular explanation of how the practice works goes as follows155:
Corporation A commits not to betray its business partner, Corporation B,
replacement cost of its assets. See Gary Smith, Tobin’s q, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2008). In the research by
Buchanan, Chai & Deakin, Tobin’s q is defined as: (equity market value + book value of total
liabilities excluding shareholders’ equity)/(equity book value + book value of total liabilities
excluding shareholders’ equity). BUCHANAN, CHAI & DEAKIN, supra note 94, at 196.
152. Id. at 204. This interpretation seems to correlate with their contention that domestic and foreign institutional investors did not always support hedge fund activists, see supra
note 117 and accompanying text, and also with their final intention of presenting a Japanese
“community firm” model that “focus[es] on the organisational sustainability of the underlying business of the company” as an opposing idea contrasting the shareholder primacy model.
BUCHANAN, CHAI & DEAKIN, supra note 94, at 324.
153. For example, it is easy to evade the prohibition against literal cross-shareholding
between two corporations by circular-shareholding between three corporations. Prohibition
against circular-shareholding might not be easy to enforce when the circle expands to include
more corporations.
154. The Act on Restriction of Shareholdings by Banks of 2001, which had a considerable impact on the unwinding of cross-shareholdings by banks, see supra notes 123-124 and
accompanying texts, was introduced in an extraordinary situation of banking crisis. Furthermore, the main purpose of this act was to ensure the financial soundness of banks. As such,
the act permits cross-shareholdings, as long as the amount of cross-shareholding is below the
threshold. It would be difficult to justify similar regulation against cross-shareholding for
corporations in general.
155. Tokutsu, supra note 12, at 508-15.
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by holding shares of Corporation B, because betrayal damages Corporation A’s own assets through the decline of the share value of Corporation
B. Further, by letting Corporation B hold Corporation A’s shares, Corporation A exposes itself to retaliation via Corporation B’s voting rights.
Logically, this explanation is unpersuasive. First, since Corporation A
is holding only a fraction of the shares of Corporation B, Corporation A
suffers only a fraction of any damage suffered by Corporation B. This
would likely not be a sufficient incentive for Corporation A to refrain
from betraying Corporation B.156 Second, the effect of Corporation B’s
retaliatory voting would be limited if the amount of shares held by each
corporation is not very large, which usually is the case.157
If, however, there is a strong norm among Japanese business people
that one should not betray a business partner with whom she is in a crossshareholding relationship, then one’s reputation would be seriously damaged if she were to do so.158 Here, cross-shareholding functions as a symbol of mutual trust, which should not be ruined. In this sense, crossshareholding, as a method of strengthening mutual trust between business
partners, is rather self-enforcing.159
To accommodate this rationale, one might consider prohibiting crossshareholdings between corporations that do not have a business relationship, which, without the impetus of an existing business relationship, can
be seen as nothing more than managerial entrenchment, while still permitting cross-shareholdings between corporations that do have a business relationship. This type of regulation, however, might lead corporations to
create unnecessary business relationships in order to engage in crossshareholdings, causing added inefficiency.

156. Major trust banks in Japan have recently introduced new products called “trusts
for unwinding cross-shareholding” (mochiai kaisho shintaku), in which a settlor corporation
entrusts the shares of other corporations to the trustee bank and sells away its beneficiary
interest, while preserving the right to direct the trustee bank regarding how to vote these
shares. This enables the settlor corporation to get rid of the financial risk from holding shares
of other corporations, while maintaining the power to exercise voting rights. See Masakazu
Shirai, Mochiai kaisho shintaku wo meguru kaisyaho jyo no mondai [Corporate-Law
Problems Regarding the Trust for Unwinding Cross-Shareholding], 76 HOGAKU 491, 493-96
(2012). The invention of such a product also suggests that the popular explanation discussed
in the texts above, which depends on such financial risk, was not reflecting reality.
157. For example, no single shareholder of Bull-Dog Sauce—which is understood to
have strengthened its cross-shareholding relationships in order to resist activism by SPJ, see
Xu & Tanaka, supra note 115, at 8-10—holds more than five percent of its shares. BULL-DOG
SAUCE CO., DAI 88 KI YUKA SHOKEN HOKOKUSHO [ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE 88TH BUSINESS YEAR] 23 (2013), available at https://www.bulldog.co.jp/company/pdf/130626_IR1.pdf.
158. This logic would apply only among those that share the same culture regarding this
norm. For the tendency of young corporations, see infra note 160.
159. Although an interesting research topic, how this idea developed in Japan is beyond
the scope of this article.
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Thus, any outright prohibition of cross-shareholding seems to be an
unrealistic solution at present.160
2. Liability
The second alternative cross-shareholding regulatory scheme is to impose liability on the directors of corporations holding shares of other corporations,161 either for buying those shares or, alternatively, for not selling
them at a premium.
Given the rationale of cross-shareholdings described in the prior section, however, these investment decisions could well be protected as legitimate business decisions intended to strengthen business partnerships.162
This argument could, of course, be challenged by asserting that the direc160. This situation might change if, in the future, fewer corporations view cross-shareholding as a method of strengthening business partnerships. In this regard, there is an interesting finding that the ratio of corporations listed in emerging secondary markets (e.g.,
JASDAQ and Mothers) that reported cross-shareholding relationships with other non-financial business corporations or financial institutions was smaller in comparison with those listed
in the traditional secondary markets (e.g., 1st and 2nd sections of Tokyo Stock Exchange).
Miyajima, Saito, Xu, Tanaka & Ogawa, supra note 126, at 8-9. This suggests that those rather
young corporations are less likely to follow traditional business customs regarding crossshareholdings.
161. Another possibility is to use JCA Article 120(1), which prohibits corporations from
“giv[ing] property benefits to any person regarding the exercise of shareholders’ rights.” Although the original intention of this prohibition is to eliminate the source of money of corporate racketeers (sokaiya), its scope is prescribed in a broad manner, and transactions between
corporations in cross-shareholding relationships can be interpreted as providing benefits to
each other’s shareholders through transactions consummated on the grounds of being a
friendly shareholder to its management. This interpretation is rather unpopular, however,
since a violation of Article 120(1) gives rise not only to civil liability for directors in the
amount of the benefit given in violation, see JCA art. 120(4), but also to criminal liability for
directors and employees who participated in the violation of imprisonment of up to 3 years or
a fine of up to ¥3 million. JCA art. 970(1). Criminal liability is a necessary measure to tackle
corporate racketeering, but it is not a suitable measure for restricting cross-shareholdings.
See Takahito Kato, Rieki kyoyo kinshi kitei to kabushiki mochiai – Kabunushi no insenthibu
kozo no kanten kara [Prohibition of Giving Benefits on Exercise of Shareholder’s Right and
Cross-Shareholdings – From the Viewpoint of Shareholder’s Incentive], in KIGYOHO KAIKAKU
NO RONRI – INSENTHIBU SISUTEMU NO SEIDO SEKKEI [THE THEORY OF ENTERPRISE LAW
REFORM – DESIGNING INCENTIVE SYSTEM] 227, 244 (Zen-ichi Shishido ed., 2011) (arguing
for restrictive interpretation of JCA art. 120 in relation to cross-shareholdings); Akira
Morita, 120 jyo [Article 120], in KAISHAHO KONMENTARU DAI 3 KAN [COMMENTARIES ON
THE COMPANIES ACT, VOL.3] 239, 253-54 (Tomonobu Yamashita ed., 2013) (same).
162. See, e.g., Tokyo Chiho Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.], Apr. 13, 2006, 1226 HANREI
TAIMUZU [HANTA] 192, aff’d, Tokyo Koto Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.], Oct. 25, 2006, 274
SIRYOBAN SHOJI HOMU [SHIRYOBAN SHOJI] 245. In this case, shareholders of Tokyo Electric
Power Company (TEPCO) filed a derivative suit against TEPCO directors, claiming that the
directors had breached their duties of care and loyalty by affirmatively responding to a
tender offer by Fuji Television (FTV) for shares of Nippon Broadcasting (NB), when the
market price of NB shares was higher than the tender price in anticipation of a hostile takeover by another party. The Tokyo District Court denied the liability of the directors, holding
that their decision—which was made in order to maintain good business relationship with a
huge media group including FTV and NB—was not extremely unreasonable.
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tors’ true intent was mutual managerial entrenchment and that the business judgment rule should not apply because of a conflict of interest, but it
may be difficult to prove this unsavory intent if there exists an actual business relationship.
3. Disclosure
Eliminating the alternatives leaves disclosure as the only realistic regulatory method, which was introduced by Japanese Financial Services
Agency in 2010.
Under the disclosure requirements, listed corporations holding shares
of other corporations for any strategic purpose, such as strengthening the
business relationship, must disclose these holdings in their annual reports,
including both the number of such other corporations163 and the aggregate
book value of those corporations’ shares.164 In addition, corporations are
required to make individual disclosures of the corporate name, number of
shares held, book value, and a detailed description of the purpose of the
holding for each of the top 30 other such corporations.165
The idea behind this disclosure requirement is to provide investors
with information on the corporation’s use of its funds for cross-shareholdings,166 thereby incentivizing those investors to monitor the corporations
and encourage them to use their funds efficiently. Disclosure would, thus,
be an effective means of using investor pressure to deter corporations
from engaging in managerial entrenchment through cross-shareholding.
For managers of corporations that are already insulated from shareholder pressure by cross-shareholdings, however, the effectiveness of this
measure will be limited.167
163. Kigyo naiyo to no kaiji ni kansuru naikaku furei [Cabinet Office Ordinance on
Disclosure of Corporate Affairs], Cabinet Office Ordinance No. 5 of 1973 (Japan) (Form 2
(Precautions for Recording (57)a(d)) and Form 3-2 (Precautions for Recording (14)).
164.

Id.

165. Id. The top 30 is determined by the book value of the shares of these corporations
on the latest balance sheet of the disclosing corporation. Id. If there is a corporation that is
not included in the top 30, but the book value of its shares on the latest and preceding year’s
balance sheet of the disclosing corporation exceeds one percent of the stated capital, then
disclosure of that shareholding is also required. Id.
166. Listed corporations are also required to disclose information regarding shares held
solely for the purpose of investment. The information required is: aggregate book value (for
the latest and the preceding business year), aggregate amount of dividends received, aggregate profit/loss from trading, and aggregate profit/loss from appraisal (for the latest business
year). Id.
167. The text above does not imply that the disclosure requirement is completely meaningless. Indeed, such disclosure would engender a negative valuation by the capital markets
of corporations holding a large sum of other corporations’ shares. However, if these corporations are insulated by cross-shareholdings, they may not care much about their reputation in
the capital market.
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F. Summary
To summarize, the practice of cross-shareholding, which is still present
in small and medium-sized corporations, has effectively diminished the
strength of shareholders’ class-based rights, thereby making hedge fund
activism difficult in Japan. For some corporations, cross-shareholdings
have even been strengthened for fear of activists.168 In other words, the
distribution of decision-making power between shareholders and management is affecting the ownership structure.169 Once the current management becomes insulated by cross-shareholding, it is not easy to unwind by
regulatory intervention.
In the U.S., cross-shareholding is not common among public corporations. However, if a shareholder empowerment movement gains momentum and shareholder rights are further strengthened, then it is not
impossible that, in the future, managers may try to insulate themselves
from the increased pressures of shareholders by manipulating the corporate ownership structure.
Proponents of shareholder empowerment might contend that this is an
undesirable reaction that should be regulated.170 In the U.S., management’s decisions to buy shares of other corporations in order to form
cross-shareholding relationships would not necessarily be protected as a
valid business judgment, because the Japanese rationale for cross-shareholding, i.e. as a method of strengthening mutual trust between business
partners, would not apply. Such conduct may be a valid source of a derivative suit for shareholders. It would be difficult, however, to detect such
activities without disclosure.171 In this regard, introduction of detailed dis168. Interestingly, the fear of shareholder power also played a large role in the formation of cross-shareholding relationships, especially in the mid 1960’s to early 1970’s, when
Japanese corporations feared takeover by foreign investors as Japan gradually permitted foreign direct investment, a consequence of OECD membership in 1964. Tokutsu, supra note 12,
at 483. For more on the process of the formation of cross-shareholding relationship after
World War II, see id. at 479-85, and Miyajima & Kuroki, supra note 124, at 83-85; see also
Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, Institutional Change and M&A in Japan: Diversity
through Deals, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 295, 307 (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed. 2003)
(asserting that the ambiguity of rules regarding takeover defenses caused Japanese managers
to resort to cross-shareholding).
169. This relationship between the decision rights of shareholders and the ownership
structure was first illustrated by Cools, supra note 16 at 755-60. The difference between the
Continental European countries that Cools discussed and Japan is that the strong power of
shareholders led to the dominance of controlling shareholders in the former, whereas it has
led to cross-shareholding relationships in the latter. This difference could be attributed to the
compulsory dispersion of share-ownership of major Japanese corporations after World War
II, which was a part of the U.S. occupational policy. Tokutsu, supra note 12, at 479-81. Formation of cross-shareholding relationship was a reaction to this situation, rather than a voluntary decision of entrepreneurs to go public. Cools, supra note 16, at 755.
170. From their opponent’s viewpoint, this could be considered a second-best solution,
although it is inefficient.
171. It is possible to obtain correct information by way of discovery in a derivative suit,
but it is costly.
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closure for shareholdings of other corporations would be useful, and effective even in the U.S.
IV. EFFECT

OF

NON-ACTIVIST INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS

The findings of Part III regarding the effect of cross-shareholdings on
the class-based rights of shareholders suggest that these rights would be
more meaningful in corporations with a lower degree of cross-shareholding, as in large listed corporations, where foreign and domestic institutional investors are more prevalent.172 Part IV examines the effect of
shareholding by non-activist institutional investors, such as pension funds,
mutual funds, trust banks, and investment advisors.173
A. “Rationally Reticent” Institutional Investors
As Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon have recently emphasized, nonactivist institutional investors are “rationally reticent.”174 They rarely
make a proposal or start a proxy fight themselves because these institutional investors or their portfolio managers, who compete amongst themselves, do not have an incentive to incur costs for actions that would
benefit their competitors.175 If other shareholders assume these costs,
however, then the non-activist investors will respond to these activists
when they find their argument compelling,176 either by voting against
management’s proposal management or by voting for the activist’s proposal.177 Also, institutional investors that have no business relationship with
172. See supra Part III.C.
173. Life insurers, which are one of the major institutional investors, are not listed in
the text because they have been traditionally considered to be a part of cross-shareholdings
relationships.
174. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867
(2013). In this regard, Japan has recently followed the U.K. by introducing “Japan’s Stewardship Code” to encourage institutional investors to “enhance the medium- to long-term investment return for their clients and beneficiaries . . . by improving and fostering the investee
companies’ corporate value and sustainable growth through constructive engagement . . .
based on in-depth knowledge of the companies and their business environment.” COUNCIL
OF EXPERTS CONCERNING THE JAPANESE VERSION OF THE STEWARDSHIP CODE, JAPAN’S
STEWARDSHIP CODE 1 (2014), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/25/singi/20140227-2/05.
pdf.
175. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 174 at 889-95.
176. Id. at 896-97.
177. Since 2010, mutual funds, trust banks and investment advisors have been disclosing
how they voted on different categories of proposals on an aggregate basis as their self-regulation. See Yuki Kimura, Kikan toshika no giketsuken koshi kekka kaiji to kongo no kadai
[Disclosure of the Voting Records of Institutional Investors and Their Future Task], KIGYO
KAIKEI, February, 2011, at 113, 113-14. For example, in 2013, these investors on average
voted against 65.3 percent of management’s proposals for takeover defense and 42.7 percent
of those relating to directors’ compensation upon their retirement. Naoyoshi Ema, Kikan
toshika ni yoru giketsuken koshi no jyokyo – 2013 nen no kabunushi sokai wo furikaette [The
State of Exercise of Voting Rights by Institutional Investors – Looking Back on Shareholders’
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the corporation in which they have invested would be more likely to
tender their shares in hostile takeovers, if the premium offered is high
enough. Thus, the more the shares of a corporation held by institutional
investors, the more likely an activist initiative on that corporation is to
succeed.178
To be sure, corporations with a high ratio of institutional investors are
typically large corporations,179 and these large corporations are less likely
to be targeted by activists.180 But this fact does not mean that an activist
campaign against a large corporation is impossible. Take Third Point’s attack on Sony, for example.181 The mere possibility of such activism constitutes a latent threat against the management of corporations that are
largely held by institutional investors and has an inherently disciplinary
effect on management, at least theoretically. But is this true in practice?
B. Effect of Shareholdings by Institutional Investors
Hideaki Miyajima and his colleagues have found strong, though not
conclusive, evidence of the effects that institutional shareholding has on
corporations. According to their research based on samples of non-financial business corporations listed in the first sections of Tokyo, Osaka and
Nagoya Stock Exchanges from 1991–2008, the increase of ROA of a corporation over a one-year period was higher when foreign investors held
more shares of that corporation at the beginning of that year.182 This result was statistically significant at a one percent level.183 Similar results
Meeting in 2013], 2019 SHOJI HOMU 27, 32 (2013). These votes “against” are not necessarily
made in response to activism.
In regard to shareholder proposals, however, this disclosure is not currently as informative, because different types of shareholder proposals (e.g., proposal to abolish nuclear power
plants, proposal requesting disclosure of the compensation of individual directors, and proposal requesting higher dividends) are not distinguished. Accordingly, the data shows that institutional investors vote against shareholder proposals in more than 90 percent of cases on
average. Id. at 31, 34.
On this point, disclosure of voting results for each proposal by listed corporations—required since 2010, see Kigyo naiyo to no kaiji ni kansuru naikaku furei [Cabinet Office Ordinance on Disclosure of Corporate Affairs], Cabinet Office Ordinance No. 5 of 1973, art. 19,
para. 2 (Japan)—would be useful. For example, in the 2013 annual shareholders’ meeting of
HOYA Corporation, a shareholder proposal for disclosure of individual director compensation received 39.55 percent of votes in support. See HOYA CORP., NOTICE OF THE RESULTS
OF THE 75TH ORDINARY GENERAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS 3 (2013), available at http://
v4.eir-parts.net/v4Contents/View.aspx?template=ir_material&sid=24266&code=7741.
178. For example, Aderans Corporation, against which SPJ succeeded in preventing the
re-election of the incumbent president and electing its own nominee, had relatively low degree of cross-shareholdings. Xu & Tanaka, supra note 115, at 13-14.
179. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
182. Miyajima & Nitta, supra note 127 at 139-40 & n.38. (finding that the effect of a
general trend of increased foreign investors is controlled by including year dummies).
183. Miyajima & Nitta, supra note 127, at 141.
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have been found for the holding ratio of domestic institutional investors,
but not for the holding ratio of banks and insurers.184
These findings are not the result of a preference by foreign investors185
for corporations with high ROA at the outset.186 Whether this correlation
is the result of a disciplinary effect of foreign and domestic institutional
investors on management or simply evidence of investment savvy that enables the institutional investors to correctly predict which corporations will
increase their ROA in the coming year, however, remains to be seen.
There is no ground, at the moment, for excluding the latter alternative.187 Indeed, institutional investors are sophisticated investors, so there
is little wonder if they are able to systematically invest in growing corporations. Even so, the linkage between institutional investing skill and their
holding ratio in a corporation is not intuitively clear,188 because passive
index funds, which are not actively managed, account for a considerable
part of high holding ratios of foreign and domestic institutional investors.
A better proxy for their investing talent, and therefore better proof in
favor of the investment savvy theory, might be, for example, the number
of institutional investors that actively included a corporation into their
portfolios, though it may be difficult to obtain credible information on this
point.
On the other hand, because the two alternatives presented are not mutually exclusive and there is similarly no ground on which to exclude the
former alternative, connecting a high holding ratio of foreign investors
with the disciplinary effect is also theoretically plausible. In fact, given the
uncertainties of the investment theory, it may not be at all irrational to
assume that disciplinary effect of institutional investors on management
has at least partly contributed to the results above. Here, the strong classbased rights of shareholders under Japanese law have an indirect positive
effect through a latent threat of hedge fund activism, even though it is still
rare.

184. Hideaki Miyajima & Takaaki Hoda, Toshi shutai betsu meigara sentaku kijyun to
gabanansu koka wo tsujita kigyo pafomansu heno eikyo [Portfolio Selection Standards of
Different Types of Investors and Their Influence on Firm Performance through Governance
Effect] 19-20, 38 (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
185.

See supra note 129 and accompanying texts.

186. Miyajima & Nitta, supra note 127, at 139. The effect of ROA at the end of previous
period is also controlled by including this as one of independent variables, which also had
positive effect on the increase of ROA with one percent-level statistic significance. Id. at 141.
187.

Tanaka, supra note 115, at 37.

188. This does not mean that there is no linkage. It is possible that the holding ratio of
institutional investors at a certain corporation is high because many institutional investors
predicted that the ROA of that corporation would increase. Thus, the latter alternative in the
text cannot be excluded.
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INDIVIDUALS

This Article now turns to the second characteristic of Japanese law, the
strong individual rights of shareholders and their ability to raise issues
with the corporation.
In the U.S., there are many restrictions on shareholder proposals and
derivative suits to protect director and management business decisions
from excessive intervention by individual shareholders.189 Conversely,
such restrictions are relatively rare in Japan, making it easier for individual
shareholders to carry out their own views on corporate governance
through a shareholder proposal or derivative suit.
What is the effect of this difference? The interests of individual shareholders exercising their rights could deviate from the interests of shareholders generally. It is, thus, possible that individuals could abuse their
rights for their personal interest. It is also possible for the actions of these
individuals to produce positive effects for the corporation by overcoming
the collective action problem innate to public corporations. The rest of
Part V analyzes shareholder proposals and derivative suits in Japan from
these alternative viewpoints.
A. Letting Proponents Express Their Views
1. SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS

BY

INDIVIDUALS

IN

JAPAN

The shareholder proposal, which enhances the strong class-based rights
of shareholders with respect to decision-making, is also a powerful tool
through which individuals can express their views to other shareholders.
Three distinct features of Japanese law contribute to the force of shareholder proposals. First, although not exercisable by an owner of a single
share, the threshold shareholding for submitting a shareholder proposal is
relatively low: one percent of all voting rights or 300 voting rights.190 The
latter absolute standard allows individuals with a sufficient (though relatively insignificant) stake in the corporation to make a proposal against
even a large corporation. Second, there is no limit on the number of proposals that a shareholder can make to a corporation in a year.191 Third, a
shareholder may make a proposal regarding the corporation’s ordinary
business operations if it is conditioned on the approval of an accompanying proposal for a charter amendment granting the shareholders’ meetings
authority over such matters.192
Traditionally, shareholder proposals have been made by groups of individuals in pursuit of a political or social agenda regarding the business of
the corporation. An example of this kind concerns a proposal by environ189. See supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text (shareholder proposals); supra notes
72-81 and accompanying text (derivative suits).
190.
191.
192.

See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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mental activists against electric power companies to abolish nuclear power
plants.193 The primary purpose of this type of activist shareholder is, presumably, to express her views to management and other shareholders in
an effort to achieve change, rather than monetary profit from the investment in shares.
Recently, a different type of shareholder proposal by individuals has
been reported. In 2012, a single shareholder of Nomura Holdings, Inc.
made 100 proposals for its annual shareholders’ meeting, which were reduced to 18 in the corporate proxy statement after screening by the corporation.194 The contents of these proposals were in many cases absurd and
humiliating,195 and they attracted public attention. In yet another example, a single shareholder of HOYA Corporation made a substantial number of proposals since 2010, including 117 proposals in 2010, 68 proposals
in 2011, and 58 proposals in 2012.196 This phenomenon has been regarded
as an abuse of shareholder’s rights by practitioners and has led to a call for
law reform, particularly with respect to the total number of proposals that
can be made by a single shareholder.197
2. Costs and Benefits of Proposals by Individuals
Before considering such reform, the costs and benefits of the current
shareholder proposal regime should be analyzed.
193.

Toshikazu Nakanishi, Kabunushi sokai [Shareholders’ Meeting], in KABUSHIKI
[TREATISE ON LAWS OF STOCK CORPORATIONS] 219, 233 (Kenjiro
Egashira ed., 2013).
194. The excluded proposals were presumably those that were not formulated as charter amendments to fit within the power of shareholders’ meeting. Sawaguchi, supra note 64,
at 22.
195. For English translations of the proposals ultimately included in the corporate
proxy, see Nomura Holdings, Inc., Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a-16
or 15d-16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 6-K) 14-20 (June 1, 2012) [hereinafter Nomura 6-K], available at http://www.nomuraholdings.com/investor/library/sec/6k/120601/
120601.pdf. The most infamous proposal, which was referred to but not included formally in
the corporate proxy, was to change the corporate name from “Nomura Holdings” to “Yasai
Holdings.” Id. “Yasai” is the Japanese word for vegetables, and the Chinese character for
“ya” in “yasai” is the same with the one used for “no” in “Nomura.”
196. Tokyo Koto Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.], May 31, 2012, 340 SIRYOBAN SHOJI HOMU
[SHIRYOBAN SHOJI] 31. HOYA did not include all of these shareholder proposals in either
the agendas of its shareholders’ meetings or the notices for them, ultimately permitting only
15 proposals in 2010, 20 proposals in 2011, and none in 2012. This led to a series of lawsuits
by the proposing shareholder. Sawaguchi, supra note 64, at 23-24. Notices for HOYA’s annual shareholders’ meetings during the relevant period are available at Shareholders Meeting,
HOYA, http://www.hoya.co.jp/english/investor/meeting.html (last visited 2014/06/11). For a
list of shareholder proposals made in advance of the 2012 annual meeting—all of which
HOYA rejected—see Sawaguchi, supra note 64, at 28-29. In contrast to the Nomura shareholder proposals, the HOYA shareholder proposals were mostly governance-related. See,
e.g., HOYA CORP., NOTICE OF THE RESULTS OF THE 73RD ORDINARY GENERAL MEETING
OF SHAREHOLDERS (2011), available at http://v4.eir-parts.net/v4Contents/View.aspx?template
=ir_material&sid=24259&code=7741.
197. Sawaguchi, supra note 64, at 26; Nakanishi, supra note 193, at 236.
GAISHAHO TAIKEI
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The costs are quite clear. With each proposal comes an increase in actual expenses to be incurred by the corporation, e.g., to send potentially
lengthy proxy statements to shareholders,198 and the opportunity cost of
using resources that could be expended more efficiently to respond to
these proposals.199
In contrast, the benefit is more difficult to evaluate. Although the great
majority of proposals made by individuals are very unlikely to be adopted,
this improbability was anticipated from the outset.200 Shareholder proposals were introduced by the reform of the Commercial Code in 1981, at
which time corporate racketeers (sokaiya) were rampant.201 According to
the drafter of the 1981 reform, the shareholder proposal was a remedy
intended to make shareholders’ meetings accessible to ordinary people by
promoting communication among shareholders and with management,
who was expected to respond sincerely to proposals, despite their potential absurdity.202
The rationale underlying the 1981 reform may not apply directly to
today’s shareholders’ meetings, which are generally thought to be conducted sincerely, without the presence of corporate racketeers.203 Nevertheless, the focal point of the reform can be paraphrased in modern
wording: shareholder proposals by individual shareholders may provide
diverse views that might be beneficial to some extent. For example, the
inane proposals against Nomura Holdings were, in part, sarcastic criticism
of an underperforming management team,204 and the proponent shareholder arguably succeeded in gaining public attention with this criticism.
Likewise, with the benefit of hindsight from the Eastern Japan Great
Earthquake on March 11, 2011, and the subsequent meltdown at the
Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant, shareholder proposals to Tokyo Electric
Power Company by environmental activists205 pointed to a risk that could
198. Although marginal cost for including another shareholder proposal may not be
large, it may theoretically become very large in the aggregate.
199. See Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 4, at 879.
200. Nakanishi, supra note 193, at 233.
201. Sawaguchi, supra note 64, at 26. For corporate racketeers, see Mark D. West, Information, Institutions, and Extortions in Japan and the United States: Making Sense of
Sokaiya Racketeers, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 767 (1999).
202. Sawaguchi, supra note 64, at 26 (citing TAKEO INABA, KAISEI KAISHAHO [CORPORATE LAW REFORM] 131 (1982)).
203. Id.; Nakanishi, supra note 193, at 236.
204. For example, the proposal to change the corporate name to “Yasai [Vegetable]
Holdings” seems to criticize Nomura’s expansion into the agriculture business, which is apparently not a core business for a financial group. See Nomura Agri Planning & Advisory
Co., Ltd., NOMURA HOLDINGS, http://www.nomuraholdings.com/company/group/napa/ (last
visited Apr. 14, 2014); see also Nomura 6-K, supra note 195, at 18 (Proposal 13, suggesting
that Nomura’s agricultural ventures are unprofitable).
205. For example, at the annual shareholders’ meeting in 2009, Nuclear Phase-out
TEPCO Shareholder Movement (datsu-genpatsu Toden kabunushi undo), a group of environmental activists holding shares of TEPCO, made a shareholder proposal to decommission
nuclear reactors at Fukushima First Nuclear Power Plant on the grounds that they were very
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seriously affect the economic viability and value of the corporation, not to
mention the broader Japanese economy.
The possible benefits of diversity of opinion derived from individual
shareholder proposals, does not necessarily mean that these proposals
worth their cost. Although it may be easier to attract the attention of management when these views are delivered as shareholder proposals, they
can also be expressed through other media, including, but not limited to,
the Internet. If management were adequately pressured to consider the
long-term interests of shareholders, then it would take these diverse views
into consideration to the extent that they affect such interests, regardless
of their delivery method.206
Whether the condition of investor pressure on management is met depends on the ownership structure of a corporation. Thus, as a rule to be
applied universally, a workable middle ground might be to introduce certain restrictions on shareholder initiatives to save corporations from undue
burdens caused by insincere proposals while preserving some room for individual viewpoints. In doing so, it is also important not to over-restrict the
introduction of proposals by hedge fund activists.
3. Possible Reform
The first alternative is to introduce a limit on the contents of shareholder proposals in order to exclude those that are blatantly absurd, such
as the ones made to Nomura Holdings. This solution gives rise to substantial uncertainty, however. If no governmental agency will issue a no-action
letter on the matter,207 then corporations are unclear208 as to where the
boundaries of absurdity lie. A prohibition of proposals regarding ordinary

old reactors built when the Regulatory Guide for Aseismic Design did not exist. Tokyo
Denryoku dai 85-kai teiji kabunushi sokai kyodo kabunushi teian gian 2009 [Joint Shareholder Proposal for the 85th TEPCO Annual Shareholders’ Meeting on 2009], NUCLEAR
PHASE-OUT TEPCO SHAREHOLDER MOVEMENT (Mar. 22, 2009, 6:56 PM), http://todenkabu.
blog3.fc2.com/blog-entry-104.html. This proposal did not mention the risk of tsunami caused
by an earthquake.
206.
views.

Of course, this does not mean that the management should or would follow these

207. Because shareholder proposals are in the realm of the Companies Act, which is
under the jurisdiction of Ministry of Justice, the Financial Services Agency is unable to issue
no-action letters. The Ministry of Justice, on the other hand, is generally reluctant to intervene in individual cases.
208. When a corporation rejects a legal shareholder proposal, the rejection might affect
the validity of other closely related resolutions. See Nakanishi, supra note 193, at 234-35. This
possibility may not be very high, but practitioners would dislike any amount of uncertainty.
See Wataru Tanaka, Gen Goto, Kenji Hasegawa & Yusuke Ishii, Kaisha hosei no kongo no
tenbo to kadai (zadankai) [Prospects and Problems of Corporate Law for Future (Roundtable
Discussion)], 2000 SHOJI HOMU 70, 94 (2013) (remark by Ishii).
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business matters or those for charter amendments, for example, would almost certainly be over-reaching.209
A second alternative is to raise the threshold for exercising the proposal right. In particular, abolishing the absolute standard of 300 voting
rights would largely eliminate proposals by individuals at large corporations.210 However, by simply raising the threshold, shareholders beyond
that threshold would still be able to make an unlimited number of
proposals.
The third alternative—to limit the number of proposals available to
each individual shareholder or group of shareholders at each shareholders’
meeting—seems to be most promising at the moment. But the question
here is, how many is appropriate? The U.S. rule of limitation to one proposal per meeting would be too restrictive in Japan, since at least two proposals are necessary to remove incumbent directors and nominate new
directors211 or to amend a charter provision and take action based on that
amendment. While there is no definitive answer to this question, somewhere between two to five proposals per shareholder or group of shareholders seems to be both logical and plausible.212
B. Deferring to “Irrational” Decisions to Sue
1. Negative and Positive Effects of Derivative Suits
The cost to a corporation of individual shareholders exercising their
rights might be greater in the case of derivative suits than shareholder
proposals. Directors and officers might become distracted from daily business operations because of their need to respond to the suit. Announcement of the filing of a suit may also cause reputational harm for the
corporation. When balanced, these negative impacts on firm value could
well be larger than a shareholder’s expected compensation from the defendants, since there are inherent uncertainties regarding probability of
winning and amount collectable.
The net present value of a suit against a director who allegedly
breached her duty at the time of filing might be negative in many cases.213
209. For example, proposals for the disposition of certain unprofitable business or a
charter amendment governing the disclosure of compensation of individual directors should
not be excluded per se.
210. See Sawaguchi, supra note 64, at 26 (noting that the absolute standard enables a
considerable number of shareholders to make a proposal).
211. A proposal for the nomination of multiple directors should be counted as one proposal, as should a proposal for the removal of multiple directors.
212. The number five as maximum is derived by adding two for removal and nomination, two for decision based on charter amendment and one for dividends. Wataru Tanaka
suggests limiting the number of proposals to three. See Tanaka, Goto, Hasegawa & Ishii,
supra note 208, at 93.
213. Empirical evidence on this point is not clear. Two event studies on Japanese listed
corporations found no statistically significant results on share price for filing of a derivative
suit. Dan W. Puchniak & Masafumi Nakahigashi, Japan’s Love for Derivative Actions: Irrational Behavior and Non-Economic Motives as Rational Explanations for Shareholder Litiga-
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As such, it would be rational for the corporation not to sue. This is precisely the reason why U.S. law respects the board’s decision not to sue, as
long as there is no conflict of interest. From this viewpoint, then, the filing
of a derivative suit that causes damage to the corporation is irrational, and
some might regard this as an abuse of right.
Such an accusation might be unfair, however, when the ex ante effect
of a derivative suit is taken into consideration. The specter of a derivative
suit is one means of deterring directors from breaching their fiduciary duties, but this function will be diminished if those directors know at the time
of their breach that their wrongdoings are unlikely to be punished.214 By
allowing shareholders to raise and maintain derivative suits, regardless of
the board’s opposition,215 Japanese law reinforces the deterrence effect ex
ante.
One concern regarding the Japanese derivative suit regime is the potential for over-deterrence. For example, directors may refrain from taking
risks that would be beneficial to shareholders in order to minimize their
possibility of being sued. If this occurs, then the pendulum has swung too
far and the overall effect of derivative suits may turn out to be negative.
2. Possible Reform
Recently, Tomotaka Fujita reviewed the structural differences between
derivative suits under Japanese and American law and suggested reform to
enable courts to effectively dismiss derivative suits that are not in the interests of the corporation or shareholders as a class on a case-by-case basis.216 There are two problems to be considered in this regard.
The first is precisely how to evaluate the general deterrence (and overdeterrence) effect of the current regime and the likely consequence of the
proposed reform on these effects.217 Although direct measurement may
be difficult, if not impossible, the classification of derivative suits by (i) the
tion, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 41-42, 73 (2012); Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue:
Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 359 (2001). Although the studies stress that no
significant positive effect was found, Puchiniak & Nakahigashi, supra at 42; West, supra at
359, which was important to their argument regarding plaintiffs’ motives, it is equally important here that a significant negative result was not found, either. Nevertheless, another finding of Puchniak & Nakahigashi, that the settlement of derivative suits have significant
positive result, Puchiniak & Nakahigashi, supra at 42, 74, suggests that the benefit of coming
out of a derivative suit (and the cost of staying in it) are substantial.
214. Fujita, supra note 84, at 58 n.53 (citing DOUGLAS BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER &
RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 117 (1994)).
215. See supra Part II.E.2.
216. Fujita, supra note 84, at 42-44, 58-59.
217. Id. at 58 n.53 (“It is difficult to deny the possibility that a large number of the
derivative suits that have been filed are undesirable and should be dismissed at an early state
(even when taking the general deterrence effect of derivative suits into consideration).”).
Likewise, while mentioning the possibility that the disciplinary effect of derivative suits might
be diminished if it becomes the standard not to file a suit when the expected return from that
suit is negative, the author stresses that this possibility is a theoretical one, implying that it
may not be a reality. Id.
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types of plaintiffs218 and (ii) the types of actions accused—such as violation of laws, transactions in conflict of interests, failure of business judgments—would be useful in conducting an indirect approach to evaluation
by analyzing the incentives of plaintiffs and the effect of derivative suits on
the decisions of the management.219
Finally, the problem of how to design restrictions on derivative suits, if
any were to be introduced, must be addressed. The natural candidate from
Fujita’s proposal is the introduction of a system similar to the special litigation committee utilized in the U.S.,220 but, again, some concerns have
been raised about the practicability and appropriateness of this tool in Japan, where the appointment of independent directors is still relatively
low221 and judicial scrutiny to the degree required in the U.S. exceedingly
costly.222 Ultimately, the search for a workable measure is left as a future
task.
VI. CONCLUSION
The rights of shareholders of Japanese corporations are strong – perhaps too strong, at least legally. First, they have strong class-based rights
with respect to decision-making on a wide range of matters related to the
corporation and ample opportunity to take an initiative. The power of the
shareholder class might actually induce managers to insulate themselves
by engaging in cross-shareholding, thereby weakening the rights of other
shareholders in practice. When cross-shareholdings are unwound, however, these shareholder rights function as a latent threat on managers, disciplining them. The key to ensuring that class-based shareholder rights are
meaningful is, thus, the distribution of share ownership and restraint on
management’s attempts to manipulate this distribution. Unfortunately, it
is not easy to unwind already-established cross-shareholdings through regulatory interventions.223
218. See Puchiniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 213, at 52-64.
219. For example, derivative suits raised by attorneys of a non-profit organization
called Kabunushi Onbuzuman (Shareholders Ombudsman), which aims to “correct illegal
activities by firms and promote sound firm activities[,]” see, e.g., Kabunushi Onbuzuman,
Kabunushi onbuzuman no annai [Information on Shareholders Ombudsman], SAKURA (Aug.
24, 2006), http://kabuombu2.sakura.ne.jp/archives/guidance.html, account for a large part of
derivative suits after 1993. Puchniak & Nakahigashi, supra note 213, at 55. These derivative
suits presumably focus on liability of directors for violation of laws rather than liability for
poor business judgment, where over-deterrence would be more problematic. See Tanaka,
Goto, Hasegawa & Ishii, supra note 212, at 93 (the deterrent effect of derivative suits seems
to be present for violation of laws and transactions in conflict of interests; remark by
Tanaka).
220. Another alternative is to require a certain amount of equity, for example one percent, to raise a derivative suit. For deterrence purposes, however, this may be overkill. See id.
221. Fujita, supra note 84, at 59 n.56.
222. Tanaka, Goto, Hasegawa & Ishii, supra note 212, at 93 (remark by Tanaka).
223. One might consider switching to the director primacy model of the U.S. to weaken
the rights of shareholders and induce the unwinding of cross-shareholdings. In order to step
in this direction, however, enforcement by the courts of fiduciary duties would be necessary
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Second, shareholders also possess strong individual rights to raise issues with the corporation, either by asserting a shareholder proposal or
filing a derivative suit, neither of which would be disrupted by the corporation for the interest of other shareholders. These rights, again, might be
too strong, incentivizing individuals to take advantage of them in pursuit
of personal goals, rather than for the good of the corporation. Yet,
whether the use of these individual shareholder rights amounts to an
abuse hinges on an evaluation of the benefits achieved, namely, the supply
of diverse views through shareholder proposals and the deterrence effect
of derivative suits on management overreaching. Possible future reforms
to Japanese law ought to consider how to strike the right balance of power
for shareholders of Japanese corporations.

as a substitute for strong rights of shareholders, especially in M&As and takeovers. Unfortunately, this enforcement is underdeveloped in Japan at the moment, making it an unrealistic
option to weaken the class-based rights of shareholders. See MASAKAZU SHIRAI, YUKOTEKI
BAISHU NO BAMEN NI OKERU TORISHIMARIYAKU NI TAISURU KIRITSU [CONTROLLING TARGET DIRECTORS IN FRIENDLY MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS] 160-62 (2013); see also Takaaki
Eguchi, Kabushiki gaisha no sihai wo meguru keieisya to kabunushi tono aidano chikara
kankei – Kakkoku hikaku to nihon no kabushiki mochiai heno shisa [Balance of Power Regarding the Control of Corporation between Management and Shareholders – Comparative
Analysis and Implications to Cross-Shareholdings in Japan], in KIGYOHO KAIKAKU NO RONRI
– INSENTHIBU SISUTEMU NO SEIDO SEKKEI [THE THEORY OF ENTERPRISE LAW REFORM –
DESIGNING INCENTIVE SYSTEM] 206, 208-09, 220-23 (Zen-ichi Shishido ed., 2011) (the U.S.
director primacy model is an appealing, but unrealistic, alternative for Japan to adopt as
the mechanism to retain management autonomy when cross-shareholdings are further
unwound).

